https://libreboot.org/faq/#intel
The Snowden leak claimed that the NSA had special Intel chips, but no one has ever claimed Intel did a special production run. However, if they stole Intel's signing keys and internal documentation, they could just reflash the existing chips and Intel would not need to know a thing about it. Anyone who gets their hands on that information would be able to do the same and there is not a thing you can do about it beside using hardware where that is not possible.
Of course, intel's microcode is not open for scrutiny, so the point is moot there (what would you sign instead?)
The linked project states that having no way to lock the boot process is a benefit. I disagree that it's a feature to advertise, because it's possible to implement in such a way that the user retains complete control. Pointing out bad implementations is not a good answer to that.
Hear hear! Why are technology people, who are supposedly intellectual, thoughtful people, so prone to unthinking political knee-jerk?
As much as such technology can suck for individual's interests when turned against them, there is just as much potential for benefit to individual interests if the technology can be aimed 180 degrees the other way.
What if all information corporations possessed about you as an individual were protected through some trusted execution environment, with only publicly vetted code operating on it? What if any individual could meaningfully revoke access to their information when corporations turned out to be evil?
Buying hardware that you don't own and control is a big problem, but that doesn't mean all methods of securing the boot process are evil. The important bit is that it's the owner of the hardware that's in control of the keys, and that (s)he can retain sole control of the signing keys if desired.