Maybe it helps to better define what you mean as the product whose operation is to be regulated. If it's the hardware, it's a general purpose computer that can run any software. We quickly go to a bad place if you can't buy such a thing, e.g. side-loading on Android is prohibited, Raspberry Pi and RISC-V are prohibited, every device must prevent you from compiling a custom program and running it, etc.
But if it's the software then you're banning the publication of encryption code.
Obviously the confusion stems from Apple being the go-to example and Apple not only providing both the hardware and the software but also actually enforcing the kind of restrictions on what software the user can run that would be unreasonable as a requirement imposed by the government on the entire market. Apple could [try to] prevent you from using encryption software on an iPhone, but it makes little sense to require only them to do that if anyone can still run it on an Android phone or PC. But the alternative is that nobody can buy anything capable of running Debian or OpenBSD (or even Windows).
Moreover, the operation of the product is the thing carried out by the owner, not the manufacturer. Apple makes a nice machine and a big detailed list of things you can do with it but the user is the one choosing which buttons to press.
> As to your printing press hypothetical, I don't think it applies. Say the back door is something like "must keep the decryption key around in case a warrant comes in." That doesn't entail any modification to the "speech" coming out of the device, does it? So how does it restrict speech?
So there are two questions here: One is, can I have the code that doesn't keep the encryption key? If not then it restricts the speech you can receive and that of other people who want to give you that code (perhaps so you can use it to communicate more sensitive information with them).
Then there is the key itself. Keeping the key (or sending it to Apple or Uncle Sam) is compelling speech. The key is also information and the key + ciphertext is equivalent to the plaintext. It's equivalent to a requirement that you keep the plaintext of all your communications.
It would effectively be compelled written testimony before the fact. Either you keep everything written down or go to jail for not having it.
> It would effectively be compelled written testimony before the fact. Either you keep everything written down or go to jail for not having it.
While I agree with you, that particular argument won't necessarily succeed, considering https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes%E2%80%93Oxley_Act and similar laws regarding reporting and information retention policies. You don't want the government equating policies to protect user communication as equivalent to destruction of evidence.
As to your printing press hypothetical, I don't think it applies. Say the back door is something like "must keep the decryption key around in case a warrant comes in." That doesn't entail any modification to the "speech" coming out of the device, does it? So how does it restrict speech?