I'm not defending the front running kind. The argument is that the front running kind (which is in no way actual front running and is instead latency arbitrage) is the same as, and fundamentally a requirement of the arbitrage kind.
Further, most peoples model of what latency arbitrage actually is, is so flawed as to create strong biases when they shouldn't exist.
The euphemism HF traders use to help themselves sleep at night.
We don't assume other kinds of middle-men require sleep aids when they do this kind of behavior (and in fact we usually encourage it), so I don't know why HFT folks would need them either.
This is all just ways of saying HFT is exploiting a loop-hole in a system to make money for themselves.
They could all be eliminated overnight and the free-market system would not notice their absence at all.
They don't provide a service to anyone besides themselves, they don't provide liquidity, they are nothing except parasites.
There are a number of incorrect assumptions built into your comment (most notably that prop HFT are the only ones using algos to trade), but the simple answer to this question is that those exchanges have larger displayed size at better prices.
Can you point out where I made that assumption?
I do not see how that will solve the problem. Suppose firm A and firm B both want to buy stock X at prize Z. There is only enough X at prize Z for one of those firms. Both firms send their trade orders withing milliseconds of each other. In your time interval scheme, which firm gets to buy the stock?
I think a better way to change exchanges is to dramatically decimalize the price levels. Right now the difference between 2 price levels a) adds a floor to the minimum spread and b) prevents strategies from truly competing on price requiring them to compete on time.
The idea that reduced tick sizes would force traders to compete on price rather than time is a popular HN market microstructure solution, but it's wrong or at least partly wrong.
1) Liquidity taking strategies will still "compete on time" in order to trade at the most favorable prices. Market making strategies will still "compete on time" in order to avoid getting picked off.
2) Inverted fee venues and midpoint order types offer sophisticated traders the opportunity to trade at prices within a 1 penny spread. If you watch the tape for a stock like ZNGA you will see this type of trading.
3) There are a number of high priced / high volume stocks that don't trade at a penny spread. GOOG is a good example. Do you find GOOG trading to be somehow cheaper, more orderly or efficient than e.g. MSFT? The GOOG spread is almost never a penny and is regularly over 20 cents. If the benefits are there, they ought to be obvious.
The reason I like reducing tick sizes (and I mean dramatically like 1/1000th or more) is less about the bid ask spread at the middle, but rather the competition at the +1 levels. A lot of the latency advantage right now is in being able to cancel a few levels near the midpoint while leaving tons of other orders stacked.
Reducing tick sizes would make these deep stacking strategies less viable, which seems (though I have no proof) like it would make the positions of the market makers less risky in a systematic way.
As for GOOG vs MSFT, I think that is obviously explained by the much higher price of GOOG right? Nothing is going to make holding a stock that costs more less risky, even speed.
"Having some participants whose primary competitive edge is speed is not in and of itself bad, but speed advantages tend to consolidate around a few natural monopolies, which is. So if we could add something else into the mix that allows for other participants to compete outside of those monopolies, that is good. Dramatically reduced tick sizes would do that, would at times make the spreads smaller, and might even make market making less risky systematically and doesn't seem to have the downsides of other options proposed".
Of course that could have been due to macro trends around volatility that have reversed recently as well, I suppose.
The value of further decimalization seems questionable. It would in all cases reduce displayed size. Would transaction costs still decline due to tighter spreads? For the liquid lower-priced stocks, probably. For stocks whose natural spread is > 1 cent (most of the expensive stuff), certainly not. For everything else, hard to say.
Maybe a Japan/Europe-style tick increment schedule is a good compromise.
If you instead mean that individual traders could input orders with floor and ceiling prices, that's something that already exists, but now you're back to the original problem of resolving whose orders execute when (inevitably) most of the orders don't match.
There are network effects in trading: people go to transact where everyone else is transacting. Because HFT is allowed on the most popular venues, the economic thing to do is hold your nose and trade there too. This is true even if HFT somehow makes the venues "worse" (which it doesn't).
Takers exploit the option value of resting orders by trading when "fair value" moves but those orders don't. "Real" investors are better off because they cheaply acquired a security they may hold for years (the fact that the price will shortly move against them by a penny or two is irrelevant). Market makers are worse off--but they're HFT guys, and it's not really your problem.
https://www.chrisstucchio.com/blog/2014/how_to_not_get_rippe...
The reason is that it's not a matter of waiting a whole second and being guaranteed a fill. It's placing an order and accepting execution risk; maybe you get a fill, maybe you are stuck holding a tanking stock.
A person buying or selling individual stocks for their own portfolio isn't impacted by HFT at all. Their orders probably never see a real exchange. Instead, internalizers pay extra money to offer brokerage customers the best possible prices for what they're looking to trade.
That's because HFTs aren't the apex predator in the markets. Informed institutional traders like Goldman are. Market making operations are built around mitigating the risk of getting run over by giant block trades from institutions. When those happen, they take out whole swathes of the order book and leave adverse price changes in their wake.
An electronic market maker will pay a premium to make safe profits off the spread of retail orders, because to a first approximation none of those orders are going to take out the whole book.
Meanwhile, among institutional traders, there are two kinds of firms to look at.
The first kind, the Royal Banks of Canada of the world, are getting paid a tidy sum of money to make large block trades for the cheapest possible price. The RBC trader has knowledge that the rest of the market doesn't: many tens of thousands of shares of something are about to trade, and that trade is going to move the market. They make money by trying to disguise their intent, so that instead of the market price reflecting that intent, they can capture the premium and leave everyone else in the market to hold the bag.
Those kinds of traders hate HFT.
The other kind, the Vanguards of the world, buy or sell based on long-term strategies. They're buying CSCO or MMM to fill out an index. They want the best possible price, of course, but they mostly care about determinism and low cost of trades.
Those kinds of traders like HFT. (You can see the Chief Investment Officer of Vanguard, the world's most trustworthy mutual fund company, saying that repeatedly and emphatically). HFTs reduce spreads and make trading cheaper, and Vanguard doesn't earn profits by taking it out of the hides of their immediate counterparties.
As a public policy matter, I'm not sure why I'm supposed to support regulations that increase Vanguard's cost of trades so that an equities desk at RBC can charge higher premiums to fleece the markets on behalf of their hedge fund clients.
HFT reduce the risk of the inventory they hold by being able to adjust the prices of that inventory fast.
HFT Market Makers can therefore price the service cheaper as their risk is less, due to the speed.
People seem to defend HFT for some reason (the front running kind, not the necessary arbitrage kind) but they never seem to answer the question of why someone who is not an HFT firm would want to trade on an exchange that caters to high frequency traders (as basically every exchange does).