This would be the key sticking point - sure you could theoretically try to unload houses and close your positions at the first whiff of a downturn, but it seems to me that liquidity would dry up much quicker now than in 2008 (30% decrease in existing home sale volume from 2006-2007, bottoming out at ~50% decrease in 2010, so pretty drastic) given how much tighter the market is, as you describe yourself.
You can also bet that Blackstone, who is effectively providing your business a baseline risk free rate of return right now, would immediately close their rent-to-buy fund if they saw any downturn in the existing house rental market, which is ultimately powered by consumer income strength. So if we don't see a meaningful increase in income, the tightness of housing liquidity would be my main concern in quickly offloading highly leveraged positions.
My medium-term outlook is that we will see the verticalization of existing urban cores - SF, downtown LA, NY, Miami, Chicago, Cincinnati, etc. We had a great boom of prosperity WWII that allowed for an unsustainable amount of suburbanization. We are now entering an era of cost-cutting, scale, and efficiency: suburbs will lose population due to their relatively high maintenance costs - roads, grids, plumbing, delivery, transportation. I'm not sure if diversification is the right strategy.
A good analogy may be CarMax, who shifted their mix in the recession towards distressed cars and ultimately kept revenue/profits reasonably consistent. Of note: This was at the same time car companies like GM and Ford were seriously at risk of bankruptcy.
A home in a non-distressed market losing nearly a third of its value in a year is "pretty slow"? That's a scary use of the term in itself.
As for housing risk, we spend a lot of time on this. A few points:
- Real Estate is very momentum driven and pretty slow. Markets don't crash in a day, like stocks. The fastest price changes in 2008 were around 3% per month for non-distressed homes in Phoenix (liquidity drops, but doesn't disappear). Our model includes "insurance" that goes up and down as market conditions change, and we believe it is pretty effective.
- Diversification by city matters a lot. Phoenix plunged in the recession. Dallas was flat. As we enter more cities, our inventory risk declines.
- The risk of another housing collapse (versus decline) is small. Debt to income ratios are sane, banks remain very cautious to lend, and there is a massive buy-to-rent industry now, led by Blackstone, that came about during the recession and quickly buys homes whenever they cross a price threshold to return rental yield.
If you're a technical person in SF and want to come by the office to learn more about our models and modeling pipelines (pricing, risk, days on market, etc) shoot me an email: [email protected]