With my programmer's hat on, they're also harder to populate programmatically, so I have a hard time justifying their use.
Any complex config file runs that kind of risk though, whether it's in a well-known programming language or an ad-hoc DSL. My preferred approach is to include most of the config in the regular code (subject to the normal review/release process), with the only thing on the server being a one-line "which config to use" setting (e.g. dev/stag/prod). Of course that has its own problems.
> With my programmer's hat on, they're also harder to populate programmatically, so I have a hard time justifying their use.
Not at all true in the case of Clojure - it's just S-expressions, very easy to write, parse or modify programatically. I agree that a config structure should have good programmatic access, but to my mind that's an argument for using a language with a good metamodel rather than anything else.
The major difference is that Clojure (Python, Lua, Perl, et al) gives you all the tools right out of the box, whereas with a DSL you should be severely restricted from doing things like reading/writing to disk, making network calls, or executing other binaries.
Granted, there are possibly ways to break out of the sandbox, but it's the difference between giving the thief a set of master keys and $50 for a U-Haul and making them work to enter every safe you have on the premises.
/me takes off the tinfoil hat
The point GP is making, and with which I agree, is that executable configurations can be dangerous if not sandboxed and even then still carry an elevated risk versus a parser. We are speaking relatively; it is absolutely still a risk to parse user input as a config, but less so than a full programming environment being immediately available to a malicious config writer.
Stepping back and identifying the malicious vector is worth it here, though, as there's a case to be made that configurations are the domain of administrators and should be secured accordingly via external means. Then the problem is recentered.