You've now gone from "Even if we get attacked, we've chosen a provably difficult / secure storage method. The damage should be negligible." to "If we get attacked - I hope like hell they don't get <single piece of secret info>."
An attack is an attack. If they can get in and steal your password database, what's to say that they can't get access to the key that decrypts your reversible database?
In other words, the information needed to extract the true raw-text password is actually included in the encrypted string.
With a hash, only a representation of the raw-text is being stored. Even if you knew exactly what was done to create that representation, you're still a long way off from understanding the raw-text.
If you treat both the key and the salt as being "known to the developer only" and either of these becomes compromised, you still don't have they raw-text of a hash, but you've got everything you need for the encrypted.
Why is reversible encryption a terrible idea for passwords?