Pick a number of passwords to lose from a table. Hash them with any of the SHA-3 contestants and a "salt": you will lose more. Hash them with bcrypt, you will lose less.
Again I'm left asking you: what's your point? What are you trying to prove? That you know that there's a SHA-3 contest? You haven't refuted anything this article says; in fact, you keep accidentally managing to validate it.
The weaknesses in SHA-1 make it a poor cryptographic hash, which make it a poor pseudorandom function, which has a significant potential to make it a poor password hash.
My point, for the second time, is that you're not "effed" if you use salted hashes.
I'm not trying to "prove" anything. I'm stating my opinion on the matter. This isn't a pissing contest, rather, a forum for discussion.
NIST expects SHA–3 to have a security strength that is at least as good as the hash algorithms currently specified in FIPS 180–2, and that this security strength will be achieved with significantly improved efficiency.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/FR_Notice_Nov0...
The argument I have is this: The passwords that are going to be hitting Rapidshare in your scenario are the crappy or short ones, whether you use bcrypt, scrypt, PBKDF2, salted hashes or HMAC. Encourage them to use bcrypt or some other iterative technique for the security benefits, but don't exaggerate and tell them that they're "effed" if they have salted hashes. They're still a long way away from storing passwords in plaintext.