"I think OpenSSL's past disproves many of the pro-OSS claims."
100% agreement.
"Defense in depth, layers of security, crunchy on the outside, still tough on the inside. If you put all your eggs in one basket, you're gonna have a bad time, unless it was a very expensive, well-engineered basket.
And even then you might still have a bad time."
Decent points. Other engineers and I went back and forth on discussions involving the latter point due to all the factors involved. A high assurance design usually worked pretty well. Yet, it might not, so Clive Robinson and I's consensus was combining triple, modular redundancy w/ voters and diverse implementation concepts. So, three, different implementations of concepts that shouldn't share flaws with at least one high assurance (preferably three). The voting logic is simple enough it can nearly be perfected. Distributed voters exist, though.
Shit gets worse when you think of the subversion potential at EDA, mask-making, fab, and packaging companies. You have to come up with a way to trust (or not) one entity. For HW, esp low hundreds of MHz, the diverse redundancy with voters should do the trick. Until the adversary breaks them all or the voter. Lol...
I think OpenSSL's past disproves many of the pro-OSS claims.
As most things, a blended approach is probably best. Defense in depth, layers of security, crunchy on the outside, still tough on the inside. If you put all your eggs in one basket, you're gonna have a bad time, unless it was a very expensive, well-engineered basket.
And even then you might still have a bad time.