This was no, "Oops, I didn't realize you minded!" situation. Aaron was fully aware that MIT didn't approve of what he was doing, and he didn't care, and was actively battling to do what he pleased anyway.
I ask because, though I've never been near MIT, everything I read about it suggests that every one of these steps is seen as part of the game expected to be played by a few curious students now and then.
Typically, when an excessive use case is reported that is determined to originate from within MIT’s network, the Libraries report this to either the MIT Information Services and Technology (IS&T) network security team or MIT’s “Stopit” group, which deals with inappropriate behavior that occurs electronically. The Stopit group’s general response is to send the offender a warning email message. This is almost always all that is needed to get people’s attention and have them stop whatever it was they were doing that caused the problem.
[...]
This time, the requests and downloads stimulated a cascade of failures that brought down multiple JSTOR servers. Half the servers in one data center failed, and JSTOR engineers feared that the entire service might go down worldwide.
[...]
Also on October 12, the Director of the MIT Libraries reported to MIT’s Academic Council that a cyber-attack of the JSTOR database had caused a weekend shutdown of JSTOR to the entire campus.
Now take a look at the "MIT Hacker Ethic", particularly bulletpoint #2: http://hacks.mit.edu/misc/ethics.html
I guess jstor staff doesn't have access to good technical texts on how to run a network.
Breaking into a closet, and connecting your hardware gets you expelled. Regardless of the locked state of the door, entering a closet to which you do not have explicit access is breaking into said closet.
That said, I'm not as familiar as I should be with what MIT tried to do to get Aaron to stop, and whether he knew that they had deployed those because of what he did.
Similar from my days at Caltech. However, there were two important considerations for this kind of thing at Caltech.
1. The "look the other way" attitude of the administration applied to members of the Caltech community, and also depended on how you were connected to Caltech. A student could get away with more than an employee or a friend/relative of a student.
2. The Caltech honor system applied. If you were hacking something without permission and the people in charge of that thing told you to stop, not stopping would have likely been an honor system violation. I'm pretty sure that repeatedly purposefully evading someone's attempt to get you to stop messing with their thing would count as ignoring a request to stop.
Does MIT have similar considerations?
Aaron was offered a plea bargain of six months.
Also, you're still glossing over the part where he tampered with MIT's network infrastructure.
And locking away scientific papers of research that was funded with public money behind paywalls is burglary of the public.
JSTOR has also convinced most of these journals, even ones with restrictive access policies, to let JSTOR make their content available for free to the public at many libraries and schools, including ones that do not have subscriptions to the underlying journals. Because of JSTOR, many second tier colleges, community colleges, and even high schools have free access to vast journal libraries that they would not have otherwise had access to. They also do a lot to bring cheap or free access to vast journal libraries to schools and libraries in developing countries.
JSTOR has probably expanded free public access to scientific research more than any other group or organization.
Sure, it would be nice if everything were open access so you could just legally get it all on the net for free, but many journals aren't willing to do that yet, and in the meantime JSTOR provides a way for most of the public to get that content at the cost of having to visit a library or school that offers public JSTOR.
These companies were not taking anything away from the public; they made the effort to digitize, process, and catalog documents, which is no small task. And they set up servers to host these documents and make them searchable. If you feel they're asking too much money for these efforts, you're welcome to simply pretend they don't exist, and replicate their work yourself. They did nothing to make that task harder.
Now, if the companies destroyed the original public records or otherwise placed new locks around them that hadn't existed beforehand, then yes, your metaphor, while still hand-wavy, would at least hold water. But of course nothing like that actually happened here.
How is creating network and identity based locks around the papers not placing new locks?
The locks you refer to were around the new, value-added work: the digitized, processed, cataloged version of the papers they had made by adding value to the original public-domain documents. The locks were not applied to the original documents.
It's like the difference between storing a touched-up version you made of an Apollo 11 photo in a vault, and stealing the original photo negative from NASA and putting that in a vault.
JSTOR doesn't claim that its documents are public-domain:
Our licenses from publishers are non-exclusive, meaning that the publishers are free to license their content to others to digitize or make it available in any way they might wish. [0]
Not only were many of the papers in JSTOR funded by the public, but JSTOR itself claims to be funded through by the public through universities: We do this with funds provided by thousands of libraries and institutions, all of whom are our partners in disseminating access around the globe. [0]
[0] http://about.jstor.org/10thingsNo, it's not.
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/burglary-overvi...
You left out the part where he snuck into a server closet and tampered with the network equipment. Among other things, that's burglary.