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Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by 1ris on Monday December 21, 2015 @02:57PM (#10773061)
But why? That's a way more complicated and a way less usefull.
Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by MereInterest on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:01PM (#10773094)
Because if you have undefined behavior, you want your program to crash and burn as quickly as possible, so that you can remove the undefined behavior. What seems to be proposed by Dan Bernstein is not so much a "boring C compiler", but rather a superset of C which does not have any undefined or unspecified behavior.
Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by kazinator on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:21PM (#10773244)
Sometimes if you have undefined behavior, you want the documented extension to happen.

Or you want the de facto widely understood behavior to happen which has happened on every compiler you've used in 30 years: at least every compiler that was for two's complement matchines. Or every compiler on which pointers to different data types were of the same size. And so on.

You also don't want to be burned by code that is relying on a common extension, when that is ported.

There is a word for the compiler approach of "we're going to optimize this based on the assumption that the program is not relying on a common extension that is technically UB".

That word is: malpractice.

For instance, it is not unusual for C code to be targetting machines in which all objects are in the same address space, such that pointers are internally like binary numbers, allowing pointers to different objects to be compared for inequality: ptr1 < ptr2 /* does ptr1 point to a lower address than ptr2 in the one big address space? /

Programmers expect this work consistently with the address structure of the machine. They don't want the expression to be somehow wrongly optimized based on the assumption that ptr1 and ptr2 must point to the same object.

Implementations must honor requirements beyond those of ISO C. Such as, for instance, behaviors that those same compilers* used to define historically in their past revisions.

If GCC has behaved a certain way for 25 years, and some code has come to depend on that, and then that is suddenly taken away, such that entire GNU/Linux distros continue to compile, but break in random places because of that detail, the fault for the regression lies 105% with the doofus who made the GCC commit. Even if that behavior is not defined by ISO C.

Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by quotemstr on Monday December 21, 2015 @04:20PM (#10773603)
> which pointers to different data types were of the same size

Member function pointer size varies widely between ABIs.

Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by kazinator on Monday December 21, 2015 @04:39PM (#10773709)
I suspect you're talking about "pointer to member", which doesn't exist in C; it is a C++ concept. This is not a pointer, but a kind of indirection mechanism dressed up in pointer syntax.

I've never seen C++ code which depended on the internals of pointers-to-member, or assumed they had the same size as other kinds of pointers.

A pointer to member is actually a complicated offset into an offset into some structure associated with an object's class. This offset can be "dereferenced" with respect to objects of different types in the same hierarchy, taking into account multiple inheritance and virtual bases, etc. A pointer to a Base::Foo function, can be applied against a Derived object, such that it resolves to the correct code, even though Base is the third base of Derived, and so Foo is in a totally different vtable position in Derived compared to Foo. (The pointer cannot be a blind integer offset.)

In C, we would make a struct containing function pointers, and a simple "pointer to member" would just be an integer "offsetof(our_struct_type, some_function)". Then worry about it later if someone wanted multiple inheritance. :)

Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by quotemstr on Monday December 21, 2015 @04:42PM (#10773727)
Nevertheless, it is a kind of pointer (it's called a "pointer") with a non-uniform size. That its internal structure is composite (just like a segmented 80286 far pointer) is irrelevant.
Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by gherkin0 on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:02PM (#10773095)
I think the idea is that any reliance on undefined behavior would blow up in your face and immediately cause a bugs, rather than working correctly with some compilers and not with others.
Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by kazinator on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:18PM (#10773212)
The problem is that undefined behaviors are used for valid extensions. "Undefined behavior" doesn't mean "error".

For instance including a platform header like #include <fortran.h> is undefined behavior. ISO C has some requirements there: if the header is found, then the directive is replaced with the preprocessing tokens from reading that header (and so if there are syntax errors there, they have to be diagnosed, and so on). But ISO C specifies no requirements as to what <fortran.h> contains, or whether it exists. On one implementation, it might cause the rest of the translation unit to be treated as a Fortran program. On an other implementation, it might bring in some declarations related to a Fortran interoperability. On yet another, translation might stop with "header not found: fortran.h".

UB is simply "behavior upon use of a nonportable or erroneous construct, of erroneous data, or of indeterminately-valued objects for which [ISO C] imposes no requirements".

Nonportable is not necessarily erroneous!

Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by pmjordan on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:26PM (#10773270)
There is a difference, in the standard, between undefined and implementation-defined (unspecified) behaviour though.
Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by kazinator on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:30PM (#10773291)
There is also a difference between "implementation-defined" and "unspecified". Look it up!

The former is similar to the latter, only it must be documented. Unspecified behaviors imply some choice from among alternatives which need not be documented. (Like the order in which the argument expressions of a function are evaluated.)

Re:Boringcc: Proposal for a C compiler for secure software by tacostakohashi on Monday December 21, 2015 @03:03PM (#10773104)
Not really. There are a lot of platforms that already have a compiler that the vendor claims is standard, so being able to ensure programs rely only on the standard would make it easy to target all of these existing platforms and compiler implementations.

The "boring" compiler doesn't exist yet, and would need to be implemented on every platform that currently has a standard compiler to be as useful.