Re:We ditched Google Analytics
by sarciszewski on Tuesday December 08, 2015 @12:26PM
(#10697843)
By the way, if anyone else wants to try to claim the $555 from Piwik based on the above theoretical attack, feel free.
How to protect from timing attacks - It's All About Time: http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html
Re:We ditched Google Analytics
by sarciszewski on Tuesday December 08, 2015 @01:13PM
(#10698178)
password_verify() compares hashes in constant-time, so, yeah...
I'll write an exploit for it (the general case, not just Piwik in particular) and drop it on OSS Sec some day, but here's a theoretical attack:
1. Guess a username somehow. Maybe "admin"? Whatever, we're interested in the security of the hash function. Let's assume we have the username for our target.
2. Calculate a bunch of guess passwords, such that we have one hash output for each possible value for the first N hexits.
e.g.
3. Send these guess passwords repeatedly and use timing information to get an educated guess on the first valid MD5 hash.4. Iterate steps 2 and 3 until you have the first N bytes of the MD5 hash for the password.
5. Use offline methods to generate password guesses against a partial hash.
The end result: A timing attack that consequently allows an optimized offline guess. So even if their entire codebase is immune to SQL injection, you can still launch a semi-blind cracking attempt against them.