For an example of capabilities that can't leak, look at Unix file descriptors. A process can transfer a file descriptor to another process via an SCM_RIGHTS message over a unix domain socket. The receiving process is able to perform exactly the same set of operations on the file descriptor as the sending process could, even if the receiving process belongs to a different user who doesn't have permission to open() the underlying file. Thus the FD is like a capability.
File descriptors are not secret tokens -- they are easily-guessable small integers. But they cannot accidentally "leak" between processes because the OS explicitly involved in all transfers.
(Of course, file descriptors still lack traceability and revocability, which a good capability system should support.)
And that's why you want them to be revocable.
You can make it a bit simpler by having the permission be a one time only token for requesting account specific permissions too. Works if you know how many people the link needs to be shared with (and ideally if you can give them separate links). But fails your goal if the link must be reused.
This makes capabilities a more honest form of systems security.