What this type of analysis turns into is, "I like this company, so I think their LTV would be very high."
The sensitivity of LTV/CAC to the assumed CAC is supremely important here.
The lesson that needs to be taken from here is the general idea of always being careful about the pitfalls of falling into the latest frenzy, and instead, focus on the REALISTIC value an investment is going to return us in the long-term.
And this "Latest frenzy vs Being realistic" concept isn't anything new, it has been going on since the era of Tulip Bulbs in the 1800s right up to the Home Loan crisis of 2008. What keeps changing and improvising, of course, are the methods of evaluating the "frenzies", or as the author suggests, "distinguishing donkeys against the unicorns"!
A lot of the estimates are really bad and completely ignore sensitivities due to assumptions, especially with CAC in the denominator which can have a massive effect when the range of ratios offered in the article is 0 < r < 3.
The difference between a LTV / CAC ratio of 2 and 3 is 50%. If CAC is assumed to be $3000 when the ratio is 2, then it only needs to drop by 33% to $2000 to get the ratio up to 3.
The author appears to consistently guess at CAC and then completely ignore the fact that a slight shift in the right direction would quickly put a company back in unicorn territory.