Even if we accept DID as a legitimate condition, that doesn't mean these separate personalities are real entities in their own right. On of the patients personalities is a 13 year old boy, with all the memories of a 13 year old boy. But these memories are completely false: they did not actually occur. People with DID don't have multiple selves, they have no self at all: their personality is shattered and stitched together by a patchwork of delusions and artificial personality traits.
We are saying the same thing. Some of the personalities are neurologically (not just psychologically) blind, some are not. That's a fascinating result, and certainly suggests that the different personalities are distinct not just psychologically but also at a far deeper level.
> People with DID don't have multiple selves, they have no self at all
It's not clear that your description and the article's are not the same, except for a preference for calling the same state "multiple selves" vs "no self." Both descriptions agree that something "shattered", and both agree that neurologically the split shards/personalities are remarkably distinct, on every level. I don't think there is a disagreement here.
In addition, the fact that brain scans confirm the psychological/hysterical blindness actually happens at a neurological level as well, proves this isn't a case of malingering or of a high-level psychological disorder. This is happening at the lowest brain level we are aware of.
Even with that evidence, I suppose one can still ask "but are they 'really' separate personalities"? And I think you're right that if it quacks like a duck and so forth, we might as well call it a duck. Another perspective: if we saw those personalities on different physical people - very distinct, both psychologically and neurologically - we would have no problem accepting them as different people. The only challenge here is that they occur in the same physical person. Perhaps that's not reason enough to dismiss them as separate.