Re:Another Dell root certificate discovered
by jacquesm on Wednesday November 25, 2015 @12:34PM
(#10628343)
What really bugs me about this whole certificate saga is this: Ok, so you messed up. But then we get this - to my ears - absolutely bogus spiel about this being for 'improved customer service'. I find it very hard to make that link. And then, to add insult to injury, after messing up like that there is no 'all hands' inside Dell to see if that 'mistake' (let's assume it really is a mistake, to be kind to them) had been made in more than one place, which in fact it is.
Once is normal, twice may be coincidence, thrice is enemy action. Let's hope for Dell that there won't be a third, and if there is that they spot it themselves before someone else does. And I'm not buying the line about 'improved customer service' even for a moment, you can't improve customer service by allowing anybody aware of this certificate to MITM any and all connections from these machines and even if that were the case it is just a little bit too convenient that such a mistake would also include the private key, which allows Dell to conveniently deny that they ever leaked the private key to anybody in particular (instead, they leaked it to the world at large).
Superfish was bad, this is in some ways just as bad or worse.
Now, Dell, can we please have a detailed technical explanation about why these two root certificates and their private keys were stashed on customers machines without their knowledge centering on specific functionality (as in what is that you could not do without these certificates and keys distributed) rather than some weasel worded techno babble about 'improved support'?
Once is normal, twice may be coincidence, thrice is enemy action. Let's hope for Dell that there won't be a third, and if there is that they spot it themselves before someone else does. And I'm not buying the line about 'improved customer service' even for a moment, you can't improve customer service by allowing anybody aware of this certificate to MITM any and all connections from these machines and even if that were the case it is just a little bit too convenient that such a mistake would also include the private key, which allows Dell to conveniently deny that they ever leaked the private key to anybody in particular (instead, they leaked it to the world at large).
Superfish was bad, this is in some ways just as bad or worse.
Now, Dell, can we please have a detailed technical explanation about why these two root certificates and their private keys were stashed on customers machines without their knowledge centering on specific functionality (as in what is that you could not do without these certificates and keys distributed) rather than some weasel worded techno babble about 'improved support'?