But nowadays it seems like not all keys are equal, and I'm under the impression that short of buying your own copy you can only reinstall the OEM, hacked-up version.
I've never tried though. I don't know if there is still a different version for OEM or VL windows like XP had different key types.
I performed a wipe/reinstall (with media created directly from a Microsoft download) and Windows 10 never asked me for a key after reinstalling it, and it reports as being activated.
Seems like they've moved away from requiring an OEM key in addition to the SLIC BIOS signature.
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150812/11395231925/lenov...
Oh, and they obfuscated the binary for iron-clad maximum security.
That doesn't suffice either, unless they also enforce HTTPS. Otherwise, any network you connect to can spoof DNS and load a fake dell.com page over http to break your security.
(Of course, even if they did require HTTPS, the attacker could serve up a fake dell.com HTTPS site signed with eDellRoot...)
And either way, they have no business even allowing an authentic dell.com page to execute arbitrary code on your system, either.
That would be, if it were not for...
$ dig localhost.dell.com
; <<>> DiG 9.9.5-3ubuntu0.5-Ubuntu <<>> localhost.dell.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 56836 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;localhost.dell.com. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION: localhost.dell.com. 462 IN A 127.0.0.1
An attacker who can either abuse an already running local webserver (like Apache configured to listen to *:80) or start up a locally running webserver (using something like python's SimpleHTTPServer) can serve their content under a Dell subdomain.
This requires some sort of local filesystem privileges or potentially RCE, but if the original commenter is correct, this can be pivoted to SYSTEM RCE.
Seriously, their entire security relied on 'if url.endswith('dell.com')', plus a bunch of home grown 'encryption' that was utterly ridiculous. I'm sure if anyone spent a good hour or so looking at some of the oodles of software they pre-install on laptops you can dig up some other juicy exploits.
1. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://... (sites down at the moment :/)
2. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/08/dell_update_security...
3. They literally just updated their home grown encryption/authentication code and made it clear that they didn't understand the issue at all.