I had a similar experience at my university. I found easy unauthenticated sourcing of most of the data needed to clone the card of anybody by name. The issue number was the only thing to guess, but easy to bruteforce on something low-stakes like vending machines. The card was used for food, a debit-card-like system, automated door locks to semi-public buildings and on-campus housing.
With the permission and cooperation of the university security, I made a card of a high-level security guy (who could have been targeted using the public/semi-public org chart) and swiped into their datacenter where all the university data is hosted, along with that of some partners with sensitive data. Luckily the innermost parts need an RFID or something which I didn't have access to, but potentially I could have tailgated or social-engineered my way into that. They weren't interested in letting me research whether I could crack the RFID. :(
I was told my demo made a big splash, but IIRC I checked a year or two later and my source for the ID data was still wide open. There's having imperfect locks and then there's leaving all your keys out in public.
How about to casually insert a duplicated key like everyone else?
My point is that being able to trivially hijack arbitrary identities without even knowing the person let alone physically finding them, is not "good enough." It'd be like if you could make arbitrary car keys with just a VIN, and the VIN is displayed prominently, it would be silly to say "Well now, it keeps honest people honest, so it's good enough."
For example, if you happen to need a unique ID for each card, and you roll your own "random id generator" you might happen to encounter pitfalls that would've been solved by using UUIDs.
Or you try to get some sort of hash value from the card info (to verify validity or whatever) and instead of using a known hashing algorithm you try to roll your own.
And I would guess a long list of etceteras.
So when a system that should be for the most part trivial to implement correctly is full of these holes then people like GP will start poking around and ultimately start finding a lot of issues that would make it actually not "good enough".
I mean sure, keys are just there to keep honest people out, but if you can use a standard key that would foil both honest AND a few opportunistic dishonest people then why are you instead trying to use your own "custom key" that happens to be much easier to defeat? Especially if said standard key is not really that much harder to implement.