For comparison -- does your average Windows attacker know how to cryptanalyze the LM hash function? No, but they can run the tool just the same.
There are absolutely places where your the general argument holds water: "no security by obscurity" is a simplistic framework, and ignores a much more reasonable and also simpler framework of costs and incentives. In several cases, the costs of figuring out something obscure outweigh the potential incentives of breaking it.
But in this particular case, there are no marginal costs to the attacker. Once someone somewhere invests the time to figure it out, for any motivation including curiosity, the defense is immediately worthless for everyone.
You're trying to protect yourself from an imaginary class of attacker that just doesn't exist.
Making it hard buys you some resistance to less skilled attackers. Since skill tends to obey a power law distribution, this is most attackers. Make it as hard as possible and you get more and more protection from more and more attackers, and so on.
Your average attacker doesn't know enough to bust out x86 assembly language to inject root code into the kernel and dump a VM's RAM. So make it so you have to do this, and you've ruled out your average attacker. The average attacker will only 'dd' the VMs' disks, which if they've encrypted data at rest will not get them the crown jewels. But make it easy to dump VM RAM and you've exponentially increased the damage from the average attacker (due to power law distribution of skill).