If you'd like, I will name an important domain with a trivial use case: skatteverket.se. It it the agency responsible not only of taxes but of nearly all personal data: marriages, deaths, everything. They have stringent security requirements for this, and to their users their security is infinitely more important than that of, say Facebook for example.
In what way would their adoption of DNSSEC cede control of anything to the NSA, or to anyone?
I think we can be done now, don't you?
You asked for a domain, any domain, and was prepared to show how Verisign could exercise their control over .com and somehow affect the validation path that DANE provides. At least that's what how I understood you. It's not always clear.
You seem to argue that susceptibility to state level actors is a counterargument to the standard, so I gave one of the few examples I know of who really need to protect against such adversaries.
Apparently my example was somehow a bad one. Take one of the big banks instead then? What could happen to swedbank.se if they signed their delegation with their TLD?
Or why don't you provide an example instead, and show in what way signing it would cede control to the NSA, or to anyone else?
* Every .COM
* Every .CO.UK
* Every .COM.AU
* Every .IO
* Every .ORG
Your response:
* The Swedish tax authority's site.
Again, there are millions of use cases where .com doesn't matter.
You alluded to some control that some large entity (which I only assume to be Verisign) exercise over every important domain. I take it that was never the case?
Name an important domain, and let's see what world government controls its DNSSEC keys.