"By default Redis listens for connections from all the network interfaces available on the server."
In my case the reason Redis ended up exposed to the Internet was another dev "updated the configuration" to the default provided by the package. Okay, perhaps that was the wrong thing to do, but it simply shouldn't be that easy to expose an vulnerable service to the Internet! I understand that people should run firewalls too but a belt and braces approach should really be taken here.
PS. While I'm moaning, Jenkins is another big offender in this respect. I can't be the only person to have tried side-step its own security by having it only bind to localhost and using SSH tunnelling only to find something which can execute arbitrary code is exposed to the public Internet when the configuration is switched back to its default. Yes, a firewall would fix it, but as far as I'm concerned, Jenkins shares some of the blame for being insecure by default in the absence of one.
Back in the day, daemons (especially IRCds) would have a 'comment me to enable' line arbitrarily inserted into the generated conf file which would prevent the daemon from starting up entirely. You'd spend 10 minutes reading through the config files rather than just presuming it was configured the way you want. The belts and brace approach should be that. Stupid users won't be able to just 'gem install <foo>' or 'apt-get install <bar>' then complain so often that an engineer who has contributed so much to the community (remember Antirez was doing this for ages, as a father, operating the entire project by himself (support and all), for multiple years before he finally was able to work on it full time) has to take time out of his day to justify "hey guys, you're sort of responsible for the way you configure your daemons".
Can you please go beyond vague references like "tons of things behind the scenes" and "certainly been evaluated". What's the direct answer to the question: "Why can't it just listen on loopback by default?"
I'm not sure "stupid users" and "clever Antirez" gets us any further towards a proper answer here.
Whoever decides to use it should do their homework and _understand_ what they are installing.
This does not mean Redis can't harden the defaults and the documentation, but is also not a fault of Redis that people are too lazy to really understand what a software stack is doing.
As is, Redis should probably default to only using the UNIX socket (where filesystem permissions apply), with TCP-enabling configuration options having impossible-to-miss warnings in example configs and documentation.
In the blog post there's this part, castigating inattentive users about falling pray to this fail-open nature of Redis:
"The problem is that, whatever we state in our security page, there are a lot of Redis instances exposed to the internet unintentionally. Not because the use case requires outside clients to access Redis, but because nobody bothered to protect a given Redis instance from outside accesses via fire walling"
Sounds like the author should really have another hard think about this stance.