Re:Pledge() – a new mitigation mechanism in OpenBSD
by caf on Tuesday November 10, 2015 @12:24AM
(#10537760)
You don't even have to copy the filenames around and mess with changing page permissions - simply doing:
static const char * const dev_null = "/dev/null";
and then whitelisting the pointer dev_null is sufficient, because string literals are stored in the text section which is mapped read-only.
Re:Pledge() – a new mitigation mechanism in OpenBSD
by amluto on Tuesday November 10, 2015 @01:51AM
(#10537949)
That only works if you've locked down mprotect, mmap, and munmap.
Re:Pledge() – a new mitigation mechanism in OpenBSD
by caf on Tuesday November 10, 2015 @01:57AM
(#10537960)
Yes, the parent covered that.
Re:Pledge() – a new mitigation mechanism in OpenBSD
by MBCook on Monday November 09, 2015 @11:52PM
(#10537689)
> Create a tmpfs, create the necessary directory tree inside it, bind-mount each whitelisted path in the tmpfs to the real file, then pivot_root into the tmpfs
You've made an excellent case for pledge("rpath", ["/dev/null"]);
So, the way I'd recommend doing the filename whitelist is by setting up a mount namespace. Create a tmpfs, create the necessary directory tree inside it, bind-mount each whitelisted path in the tmpfs to the real file, then pivot_root into the tmpfs. This sounds complicated but is actually not very much code, and again a library could make it easier.
But I think you could also do it with pure seccomp. The trick is to copy the filename list into memory pages that you subsequently mark read-only. Then, have your seccomp filter whitelist specifically pointers to those strings, and prohibit making the pages writable again.
(Disclaimer: I just came up with this on a whim, it probably needs more thought.)