This is false: even if somebody compromises the initial setup (which, if implemented using the proposed MPC protocol, would require compromising every single participant; compromising n-1 parties doesn't do anything), the system continues to enjoy the same zero-knowledge guarantees. Compromised setup or not, in Zerocash the anonymity set is all participants of the system.
Also there is nothing so suggest that a clever MPC will solve the collusion problem. Of course the participants will make claims about their honesty, but if ZeroCoin is worth massive amounts of money the temptation to seek collusion will be there.
Of course, whilst it's true that some participants might stick to their proverbial guns, what is going to prevent a motivated state-level attacker from monitoring as many participants as they can during the computation? Then they only need to compromise the handful that they couldn't monitor, and for that they have rubberhose cryptanalysis.
Zerocoin's trade-offs are massive: untested / unreviewed cryptography, a trusted initial accumulator that can ruin the anonymity for everyone forever, a significantly larger transaction size, and a blockchain so opaque that double-spends and false coin creation cannot be seen.
Those are the issues that matter, and Monero suffers from none of those problems.