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Re:Grsecurity Developer Spender's Feelings on the State of L... by fulafel on Friday November 06, 2015 @08:58AM (#10519444)
The concept you list are orthogonal to most sources of kernel vulnerabilities and most of grsecurity's defenses: C-related exploitable memory safety bugs. grsecurity's C exploitation mitigation tech is just a band-aid for these.

Of course a kind of Amdahl's law applies to these: eliminate memory safety related vulnerabilities, capabilities and such become important in eliminating the rest of the bug classes...

Re:Grsecurity Developer Spender's Feelings on the State of L... by nickpsecurity on Friday November 06, 2015 @07:25PM (#10522967)
Yeah, but you get really far by eliminating memory and control flow attacks. There's also relatively cheap ways to do that with hardware and software. There's even schemes like SAFEcode/SVA, Code Pointer Integrity, and Softbound + CETS that do it automatically with a performance hit many apps can take.

Yet, what's uptake of such methods in mainstream, kernel development? There's the problem.

Re:Grsecurity Developer Spender's Feelings on the State of L... by fulafel on Sunday November 08, 2015 @02:46AM (#10527874)
Or you could just use a memory safe language instead of getting into the C mitigation arms race.

Time and time again mitigation techs have gotten widely deployed, exploits have caught up, it's a perpetual cycle. Yes the exploitation gets a little harder each time around, but you don't get sound memory safety that way.

Re:Grsecurity Developer Spender's Feelings on the State of L... by nickpsecurity on Sunday November 08, 2015 @10:13AM (#10528671)
I agree: my main recommendation for new projects. However, avoiding C or porting Linux/BSD to a safe language fell on deaf ears for decades. So, for them, I recommend techniques that work with C and UNIX architecture. Maybe more progress that way.