Re:New Tricks for Browser Fingerprinting [pdf]
by kardos on Tuesday November 03, 2015 @05:57AM
(#10498721)
The HSTS timing trickery is basically just an information leak bug that needs to be widely fixed; TorBrowser has fixed it [1].
Re:New Tricks for Browser Fingerprinting [pdf]
by wlesieutre on Tuesday November 03, 2015 @10:03AM
(#10499943)
Demo in Firefox 42 didn't identify a single site as "probably visited," so I'm not sure what to make of that. Did it work for anyone else?
The presentation takes a while to get around to it, but it's a way to see your browser history using cert pinning/redirection. Specifically (ab)using features in the browser that even the paranoid don't disable. And then using that information to fingerprint you.
Demo: http://zyan.scripts.mit.edu/sniffly Code: https://github.com/diracdeltas/sniffly
It's a good find, even if it's not perfect the way the CSS link visited computed style checks was.