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Re:OberonStation, an Oberon RISC workstation by nickpsecurity on Saturday October 31, 2015 @08:32PM (#10484888)
It's actually most of the "pro's" and amateurs alike that have gotten people compromised for over a decade giving bad advice. The advice to all standardize on a few things that get the most attention by attackers resulted in botnets of hundreds of thousands to millions of nodes that required just a few 0-days & pre-made expliot kits with high reliability. My methods blocked all of that in the field despite tons of recorded attempts and even pentesting by pro's. Everyone else doing it had same results. QED. So, are you all continuing to offer the same bad advice because you're amateurs at real security or just involved in defrauding your customers for profitable consulting fees?

So, let me break it down again in concrete, proven terms suppored by decades of INFOSEC research and field work. History shows any complex system has vulnerabilities. To attack, the attacker must know the system, the vulnerability, how to exploit it, and the specific configuration. If defence in depth, then the attacker must know that for the whole route to them. So, you either have to make those have no vulnerabilities (good luck) or you have to implement measures to prevent their exploitation. That requires changing one or more of the pre-conditions of a successful attack. So, measures that eliminate vulnerabilities by design (eg Correct-by-Construction), prevent their exploitation with obfuscation/transformations, or deny enemy knowledge of their existence all provably increase security. I combine all of these in anything I do with strongest, most-analysed versions of each that are available. Positive field results followed while others get smashed repeatedly.

Note: This is especially true if the operational requirement in question, like protecting whole HW lifecycle, is in its infancy in INFOSEC techniques and has little to go on. Then, obfuscation, applying strong stuff where possible, R.E. samples (eg ChipWorks), and layers of detection/audit are best thing you can do. It's what we're doing now. You're side would suggest mask/fab/packaging companies should publish all source code and security methods online for attackers to study. Given what happened to desktops and servers, I'm glad they're listening to me instead of you. ;)

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