There's also some unencrypted content which could be dumped with a signed ROM on a locked/powered off phone, although I believe there are ways to dump this as non-apple. This has evolved over time -- it was much more open pre iOS 8, and I haven't read the entire iOS 9 documentation or tried to verify it for iOS 9 yet.
The rate limit portion is in hardware, but the 10 tries is not. IMO Apple should make an effort to avoid being in a privileged position for deployed phones; it's unavoidable with iCloud for the current architecture, but they could do a lot to avoid the "special rom can dump more" issue. At the very least the 10 tries and dead could be moved into hardware.
Honestly if Apple can indeed break their own security, I would call that fortunate for not advancing the inevitable showdown. Widespread proprietary software puts us in a very poor position for creating precedents, since Apple is eminently controllable by USG.
Can you elaborate on that a bit? I didn't see anything in RIPA that criminalizes open source encryption.
It seems like USG will be unsuccessful at compelling Apple to unlock the phone. If there are no security vulnerabilities in the trusted hardware, then there is literally nothing special Apple can do to help unlock it. Although we can hope for a stay (in the sense of not advancing the inevitable big picture) whereby USG successfully attacks the chip with acid.
There may then be a detour where USG attempts to compel Apple to push an update to a new (and unknowing) suspect that renders their security moot. This entire process would be under a gag order (since it's an ongoing investigation), so perhaps it's even already happening. Once again, I guess I hope this is successful to avoid the otherwise inevitable showdown.
The next move directly pertaining to this situation will be for USG to push for some law banning the sale of encryption that cannot be opened with a court order. Yes, this battle has been fought before. But this time we're dealing with a purpose-built device, distributed turnkey by a commercial company. USG may not be able to compel Apple to act, but it can certainly constrain their actions when they do.
Also, technology is now acceptable to put on the "news" so the entire populace can be browbeaten with the four horsemen to make them compliant and dilute techies' informed voice. The percentage of civil disobedience will be insignificant - LUKS will likely not be setting precedent.
Plus the major technology companies having become part of the establishment and vice-versa, so cooperating with the government is in their direct business interest (as long as the PR is managed). In this larger situation, Apple will cry uncle long before USG does - I doubt they want an import ban.
So all of this points to such a law being passed, I'd guess 2-3 years out. If Free solutions aren't outright criminalized by the same legislation (ala RIPA), then something supplemental after that. It's a lot easier to "address" questions of constitutionality and basic human rights against a single unsympathetic defendant.
Will we successfully retreat to steganographic filesystems, and can we encourage enough drug dealers et al to adopt them such that the leviathan encounters effective technological pushback? Or do we have to wait for all of this to become widely accepted, then for norms to adapt and persecution to finally end? Interesting times indeed.