If you had been more cautious with respect to this one type of event at this one plant, you would have prevented this problem at a low cost. The problem is that only really tells you that 'if you know what's going to happen, you can do a really good job planning for it', which is rather obvious and completely useless.
My point is that if you were to have been more cautious in the overall specification for the plant (because, again, the plant was never designed to survive the type of event it was subjected to,) it is not clear whether the generators would have been moved (as that may not have been a high priority compared to other improvements), or even if they had, what the cost/benefit ratio would be. You have to remember that there may be many other events which may have appeared more likely than large earthquakes and tsunamis, and those would probably have been seen as more cost-effective safety enhancements, and would have been waste. In addition, this heightened standard would be applied to all the power plants subject to similar regulation, which would have been further waste.
The important question is not what the cost/benefit ratio for moving generators at Fukuhima before the tsunami would have been, but what the cost/benefit ratio for taking precautions against all events of similar likelihood and impact in would be for all power plants (or even all infrastructure) would be.