The most obvious design failure at Fukushima was not "how big a tsunami we should protect against" but not asking "how will we cope when the seawall fails".
If the critical backup generators had been in a bunker designed to protect them from a seawall breach, the disaster would not have happened.
Having said that, the next questions are usually: what is the likelihood of it going wrong and what is the cost of mitigation? I don't envy the people making those decisions on something like a nuclear reactor, with or without hindsight.
The idea behind orthogonal backups, however, is that since they are independent, very high reliability can be achieved with low reliable components. For example, if you've got a main with 90% reliability, and a backup with 90% reliability, the combined reliability is 99%. This can be a lot easier and less expensive to achieve than making one component 99%.
The backup generators could have a cheap extra seawall built around them, or could have simply raised them up on a 10 foot platform, or built them with snorkels like a jeep designed to cross streams.
Building a heftier main seawall would have been an order of magnitude or two more expensive.
But claims would seem to be little more than a thin gloss on the unbreakable unobtainium[1] of your hindsight.
If they'd built the generators on a hillside that was washed away in a mudslide the article would read "Critical backup generators were built on unstable hillside despite warnings from scientists".