So is science.
Please don't tell me we're going to play that tedious game where we give you lots of examples of philosophy's relevance and your response is just "oh but I didn't mean that kind of philosophy".
Kuhn says that this works well for a while, until there builds up a collection of anomalies that result in the second type of science: revolutionary science. For a short while, people start to question fundamental assumptions about their world and this results in a "paradigm shift". In this mode of science, philosophy has always been relevant. The philosopher Ernst Mach was relevant to Einstein, for example.
In our present age, we are at the stage of normal science started by Einstein and the quantum physicists. But anomalies have started building up. And when we enter into the new phase of revolutionary science, as happens every few hundred years, we'll see philosophy be relevant once more.
The philosophy of science did not precede the development of science; in fact, it was the other way around.
I am at a loss as to how to be any clearer, but perhaps that's because I am looking at the whole sentence in the context of the thread. Could you be more specific about what problem you are having with it?
There was a time when people doing science were considered philosophers; at the same time, some of them were considered astrologers or alchemists - Newton was active in both of these fields, and that was not, as it seems to some people now, an aberration or contradiction. These philosophers / astrologers / alchemists synthesized the scientific method, but the modern philosophy of science is descriptive, not prescriptive: philosophers like Popper and Kuhn were describing the scientific method as it had already been developed by practicing scientists, without being led there by academic philosophy. The historical role of people, who now are or were then regarded as philosophers, in the early development of science does not imply that current science is behoven to current academic philosophy.
Your attempt to conflate philosophy and science raises the question of why a university would need an independent philosophy department, and I think you would find its members to be the ones most strongly defending its existence. If you were to go to the top of this thread, you would find that the distinction between science and philosophy is being made by pierrec’s philosopher-student friend. If you want to argue that there is no meaningful difference, perhaps you should first persuade the people who identify themselves as philosophers.
Then there's the fact that you have ended up agreeing with me that scientists can do it themselves.
Logic has traditionally (at least since Aristotle) been considered a critical branch of philosophy.
You apparently practice the passive-aggressive school of philosophy - the one where you write as if you are disagreeing with someone, but you neither offer any specific rebuttals of the other's arguments, nor do you make any specific, refutable statements about your own position.
But none of this matters anyway. If you want to argue that science needs philosophy, and regardless of what metaphor you are trying to pass off as an actual argument, the one thing you have to do is to show one or more significant examples where contemporary science has depended on contemporary philosophy. Without that, anything else is just talking around the issue. Of all the people who have replied to this thread, only shabda seems to understand this.
I get your point that scientists sometimes do things that can be described as philosophy in the broad sense, but generally, I do not think they would be able to do that if they had been educated in academic philosophy. I believe Bohr himself falls into this category. It would be more accurate to say that philosophy is dependent on science in these matters.
I also get the point that scientists use the scientific method that was developed by people who can be called philosophers, but they developed science through doing it, and that is not a dependent relationship even if you call what they did philosophy.
With regard to examples, I am sticking with my position that they are the only argument that really counts (which is why I suggested it to pierrec), but I don’t think there are none: for example, I think Daniel Dennett has made many valuable contributions to cognitive science, and made a number of trenchant observations with regard to the expectations of computational neurologists.
I don't think the Wikipedia phenomenon means a whole lot. Here's an alternative metaphor: philosophy is the pot we put all the loose ends in, until some advance in science allows us to work on them some more. That doesn't mean philosophy is making progress on them.