Re:New attacks on Network Time Protocol can defeat HTTPS and...
by Animats on Friday October 23, 2015 @03:29AM
(#10437300)
Turning the clock back won't help defeat HTTPS if the root certificate store doesn't contain obsolete certs. The root certs will become invalid before their validity dates.
There is a clock attack which can brick many GPS receivers. GPS time uses a "week number", which is only 10 bits. Every 1024 weeks, GPS time wraps around. The first rollover was on 1999-08-15, and the next rollover is 2019-05-06. So standalone GPS receivers (not phones; they're "assisted GPS" and have to talk to a server) store a value indicating which rollover period they are currently in.
Sending phony signals to a GPS receiver which gradually advance the time can, for some units, convince it to advance the rollover period number in nonvolatile memory. On some devices, no way to reset it at all. Once this has happened, the ephemeris data won't be used properly, and it can't produce valid location data.
There is a clock attack which can brick many GPS receivers. GPS time uses a "week number", which is only 10 bits. Every 1024 weeks, GPS time wraps around. The first rollover was on 1999-08-15, and the next rollover is 2019-05-06. So standalone GPS receivers (not phones; they're "assisted GPS" and have to talk to a server) store a value indicating which rollover period they are currently in.
Sending phony signals to a GPS receiver which gradually advance the time can, for some units, convince it to advance the rollover period number in nonvolatile memory. On some devices, no way to reset it at all. Once this has happened, the ephemeris data won't be used properly, and it can't produce valid location data.