Re:A riddle wrapped in a curve
by paulmd on Thursday October 22, 2015 @11:11PM
(#10436592)
The problem is fundamentally that the most top-security ever possible is an offline piece of paper locked in a Mission Impossible-resistant bankvault that only the President has the capability to open.
But then you can't actually use it to do anything and its existence is purely a downside. And you can't put it online - in any fashion - without exposing it to some possibility of compromise. Whether that's by one-or-more sysadmins who take a massive bribe (compromising two decades of SCI-level USG secrets => name a number and we'll pay in Billions), or users who can perform sidechannel attacks, and so on.
Everyone knows what happens once you expose real systems to real users/admins (should be read as "attackers"). You cannot design a black box that miraculously requires no administration and is not vulnerable to any sidechannel attack when your threat category is state-level actors.
I actually suspect the NSA does fall into the category of "altruistic actors" here. Their number-one concern is making sure that nobody can decrypt the things that nobody should be reading. I don't think they're above pulling a kleptographic backdoor if there's a computationally-strong guarantee that nobody else can break it (perhaps while learning a hard lesson about socially-strong security) but at the end of the day I do trust that they won't be broadcasting State Secrets in something that will be publically accessible within a decade.
When dealing with a state actor like the NSA you need to reverse Hanlon's Razor - they may be malicious, but they're not stupid. They know when the jig is up and it's time to cut their losses.
But then you can't actually use it to do anything and its existence is purely a downside. And you can't put it online - in any fashion - without exposing it to some possibility of compromise. Whether that's by one-or-more sysadmins who take a massive bribe (compromising two decades of SCI-level USG secrets => name a number and we'll pay in Billions), or users who can perform sidechannel attacks, and so on.
Everyone knows what happens once you expose real systems to real users/admins (should be read as "attackers"). You cannot design a black box that miraculously requires no administration and is not vulnerable to any sidechannel attack when your threat category is state-level actors.
I actually suspect the NSA does fall into the category of "altruistic actors" here. Their number-one concern is making sure that nobody can decrypt the things that nobody should be reading. I don't think they're above pulling a kleptographic backdoor if there's a computationally-strong guarantee that nobody else can break it (perhaps while learning a hard lesson about socially-strong security) but at the end of the day I do trust that they won't be broadcasting State Secrets in something that will be publically accessible within a decade.
When dealing with a state actor like the NSA you need to reverse Hanlon's Razor - they may be malicious, but they're not stupid. They know when the jig is up and it's time to cut their losses.