ISTR it was more like:
Server: I support the following auth methods ["password"]
Client: Cool, let's use "none"
Server: Okay.
You could be right, it's been a long time since I looked at that one. I just remember that the client claimed not to support any authN methods and the server decided that was just fine.
Re:CIA Director John Brennan emails
by thieving_magpie on Wednesday October 21, 2015 @06:53PM
(#10429385)
I remember reading that article about the open ports and distinctly recall they left out whether or not this was a public facing. Not that it justifies anything, but it wouldn't be egregious.
It was found by someone scanning the internet at large and publishing results. Someone else went through that data long, long after the fact and looked to see if they'd ever scanned her servers. Because of that background, the public was able to see the ports--they would not have appeared in the scans if they were non-public.
But that doesn't mean she actually had VNC or RPC software actually listening on those ports, or that the software that was listening (whatever it might be) was actually vulnerable. It might be more likely than not that it was vulnerable--I mean, that's why security people look for things like that to begin with--but false alarms aren't exactly uncommon, either and my customers have proven to me that there's no shortage of bizarre server configurations in the wild.
By the same standard we should count people using SSH and TLS (really: about any given protocol) as clueless, as implementations of both have had wide impact remote vulnerabilities.
I agree this all is testament to widespread cluelessness, but more on the software industry level...
I don't believe I claimed anyone was clueless, that they were actually vulnerable to any known issues, or even that VNC or RPC were actually running on those ports. As far as I know, nobody knows any of that.
Mea culpa. Too much firewall angst I guess!
[1] It was a really dumb bypass, too: Client: The authN methods I support are: [empty list]. Server: Ok, let's just skip authN.