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Re:BoringSSL by tptacek on Tuesday October 20, 2015 @06:28PM (#10422267)
The difference matters, but on Linux, the difference means that you need to avoid /dev/random, because the blocking behavior virtually never helps security but always reduces reliability.
Re:BoringSSL by nickpsecurity on Tuesday October 20, 2015 @08:02PM (#10422731)
"because the blocking behavior virtually never helps security but always reduces reliability."

I like how you put that. Best way to because infrastructure reliability is way too important to sacrifice over questionable security gains. Puts a QED on the whole discussion.

Re:BoringSSL by lomnakkus on Wednesday October 21, 2015 @04:24AM (#10424250)
Of course you probably already know this, but I think the root problem that OP is driving at here is that if you use /dev/urandom then you risk getting predictable values from /dev/urandom at startup[1], e.g. when initializing your server's SSH keys (or whatever). I seem to recall this being the root cause of thousands upon thousands of home routers being having weak keys. As such, it's important to point out.

[1] That is, before enough external entropy has been gathered.

Re:BoringSSL by oconnor663 on Wednesday October 21, 2015 @11:11AM (#10425964)
I think the new `getrandom` interface fixes that, by blocking until /dev/urandom is initialized.
Re:BoringSSL by lomnakkus on Friday October 23, 2015 @04:06PM (#10440996)
Yes. Yes, it does... but it's not transparent to userspace, which I think is what tptacek was alluding to. (And, frankly, is how it should be. However, the Linux kernel maintainers are absolutely fanatical about backward compatibility for userspace, so here we are with a new syscall.)
Re:BoringSSL by binarycrusader on Tuesday October 20, 2015 @10:28PM (#10423299)
If your cryptography requirements require high entropy for the random numbers generated, then blocking is the right answer.

In practice, that's rare, but some consumers have strict, hard requirements that can't be ignored.

Re:BoringSSL by Tomte on Wednesday October 21, 2015 @02:18AM (#10423975)
Once your CSPRNG has enough entropy in its internal state it has got this entropy.

Retrieving output bytes doesn't change anything.

The view "take three bytes output, lose three bytes entropy" is simply not correct.