I think perhaps more proper would be to say, whether there is an underlying determinism or not is irrelevant (and that's what Dennett is saying). Free will (as in freedom) is relevant.
And about that question, it's quite easy to:
- Build a deterministic system on top of non-deterministic one. Just take a lot of indeterminism and average it. For example, we do that with computer gates, which are deterministic, but built on very non-deterministic (random) behavior of atoms.
- Build a non-deterministic system on top of deterministic one. Take a pseudorandom generator and keep the seed/algorithm for yourself. For example, we do that in operating systems, where operating system itself is deterministic but each application lives in non-deterministic environment, because it doesn't know what other applications or processes are running inside the system.
So just going from atoms to applications, we switched from non-determinism to determinism and back!
This may be a bit nit-picky, but if i understand correctly, the fact that other agents in the system influence the one you understand in ways you don't is not the same as non-determinism. Arguably, if you knew the exact system date and all other software installed, you could predict exactly how your program would behave. It's just because most systems are sloppily specified (if at all, mind) that this isn't how it works.
But maybe i'm missing something fundamental ;).
First of all, there is a difference between what you can predict about the system and what you want the system to be. Since even on nondeterministic system you can build a deterministic one, it doesn't matter what you can or cannot predict about the underlying system. If you want a deterministic system, you can simply ignore the unpredictable parts by averaging over them.
Although, if you know the other software, you could predict the system. But normal application, unless it has root privileges or there are privilege escalation loopholes, cannot inspect the whole system and cannot see all the processes that go on. Therefore, deterministic modelling of the system from a perspective of one application is impossible.
But there is actually a simpler example. Just take an application using the pseudorandom number generator. You can't know if there are other processes using the generator too, so once you use pseudorandom generator, your application becomes non-deterministic. If on the other hand the application wants to be deterministic, all it has to do is not use system-wide generator of randomness, regardless of whether the generator is actually deterministic or not.
The point is, for free will to exist, it doesn't really matter if the universe is deterministic. Just as it doesn't matter in D&D game if the result is determined by dice rolls or a pseudo-random number generator with a known starting seed. People cannot calculate the latter in their heads, so the difference won't affect their reasoning (these things are conditionally dependent on the observed reality); that's all that matters.
But I don't fully understand why so many smart people, including non-believers, can't see the obvious: that determinism has nothing to do with free will. Free will is just a mechanism of finding a path between the set of natural forces operating inside our mind, including all the range of motivations, from basic instincts to sublimated aspirations.
The opposite to freedom is slavery, either from external circumstances or from own instincts that, in turn, is caused by external circumstances: arrested development, physiological defects or the mental illness.
So lack of freedom has causes and freedom has causes too (configuration of our brain and a favorable environment). The opposite of freedom is not "uncaused".
Requiring no determinism is one more example of the not true scottman fallacy. Or moving goal posts.
The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules. Given the fact that our brains are just[1] a huge set of particles and chemical processes it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person.
In other words, we don't actually make any decisions for ourselves. It's all determined by chemistry.
If that's true then someone could argue that the path of their life was predetermined by the state of the universe at any given time, so the fact they shot their wife was actually nothing they could have had any control over, and it's very unfair to lock them away for 30 years if they couldn't have changed anything. It's just the latest outcome of a chemical reaction that started at the Big Bang.
It's actually a very compelling argument. The counter argument requires 'magic' in the form of something that we can control that can't be measured. That's a big ask for any rational scientist.
[1] Pretty huge 'just' there because it discounts God, souls, etc. Many people think that the brain isn't just atomic particles. But there's no evidence that they're right. We've cut brains up and looked.
Predictabilty hasn't anything to do with freedom either.
it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person
So what?
In other words, we don't actually make any decisions for ourselves. It's all determined by chemistry.
Nonsense. We are the chemistry, we are our brains. Are we "determined" by ourselves?
the fact they shot their wife was actually nothing they could have had any control over, and it's very unfair to lock them away for 30 years
That comes from the ancient and barbaric conception of penal justice as retribution. Punishment is a disincentive and the very right thing to do to prevent crime.
Edit: also that's again the faked duality. "...nothing they could have any control over" as if the subject is a pure soul completely apart from the universe and its forces. The subject is part of the universe, exactly the part of the universe that could have any control over killing or not killing. We put that part of the universe behind bars to prevent it from killing again and sending a message to other parts of the universe that could feel tempted to do the same. Also, in theory, to try to modify that part of the universe so it wont kill again.
But this isn't even deterministic on its own terms. Particle decay is stochastic. Quantum tunneling is stochastic. There's a constant, silent rain of neutrinos that don't interact nearly all the time.
Fully deterministic analog electronic computing is impossible because we cannot eliminate Johnson noise and shot noise. Why do people then think that neural computing would be noise-free?
>The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules. Given the fact that our brains are just[1] a huge set of particles and chemical processes it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person.
yes. Absolutely true. In theory. The coin head/tail outcome can be modeled and predicted even more easily than brain. Thus the coin is an example of determinism. In theory. On practice though it is the thing that comes among firsts to mind when we talk about in-determinism.
Giving the amount of computations necessary to perfectly model even a coin, less a brain, and the minimum energy cost of a unit of computation, it may be so that such perfect computer is just not possible inside our Universe (it may happen that Universe is the smallest computer that can run such simulation and that exactly that it is doing right now :)
That is not true. The quantum mechanics doesn't disprove determinism, but is clearly states the result can not be predicted, because an act of measurement changes the outcome.
That means it's not magic, but uncertainty that makes exact outcome of a system unpredictable. We can just know probability of the outcome.
Of course this unpredictability doesn't mean there's free will, it just means that we will never be able to find out with a 100% certainty what we will think even if we measured every little detail about the brain.
And if the argument is "But let's imagine we knew every little detail about a brain to atomic level, then we would surely know what he will think in the future" then we are talking about imaginary things. Magic knowledge doesn't exist.
.. which are vastly incomplete, themselves, because we have not reached the limit for where the atoms stop and the particles begin, and even beyond that, there is much evidence that we have not gotten, in fact, to the bottom of things.
>The counter argument requires 'magic' in the form of something that we can control that can't be measured. That's a big ask for any rational scientist.
Good thing rational scientists are willing - pun intended - to continue the investigation and discover just what it is we have not measured, and cannot measure, until we decide to do so.
Can decisions be weighed? Do they have mass, energy, substance? Does a decision exist somewhere in the universe, or is it able to move around the physical universe unhindered by physics? It could be argued that there are no definitive answers to those questions ..
But if the mind (note wording change) were not just atomic particles (that it, God, souls, or some such was involved), when you cut brains up and looked, what would you see?
Then, unless you are positing some kind of outside force, the free-will-mechanism is also a natural force and a component of our brains and describing it as "free will" is not really sensible, since it is neither "free" except in a very limited sense nor a "will".
I prefer to say that the thing we call "free will" is simply a confusion of ideas and it doesn't really make sense to talk about free wills or unfree wills. That's often the case with longstanding philosophical problems, which often began with superstition and then had centuries of extremely intelligent people devising concepts and arguments to justify and validate them. With free will, the problem is complicated by the fact that people do have a feeling of free will.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
See in particular, 3.3.
Of course, it's both, we're part of nature!!!
describing it as "free will" is not really sensible, since it is neither "free" except in a very limited sense nor a "will"
That's nothing more than semantic juggling. I've defined precisely what I understand as freedom, not an esoteric concept at all, but the absence of obstacles. You just ignored it, invoking exactly the falacy I mentioned: "except in a very limited sense". Why is it "very limited"? You don't even try to justify that qualification.
And "not a will"? Oh, come on! What is your definition of will? Something that has no causation? Of course our will is caused, by instincts based on natural needs: food, sex, group bonds, in the aspiration to dignity, improvement and solidarity. We're not free in a vacuum, but free to decide what means lead more effectively to goals and a personality that are given to us.
With free will, the problem is complicated by the fact that people do have a feeling of free will.
No, that's the most simple and truthful intuition. The complication comes from people trying to apply abstractions out of place and concluding that nothing heavier than air can fly.
To my reading, you did not address what it actually means to choose, which implies some kind of unmoored Cartesian ego selecting one alternative or another.
> And "not a will"? Oh, come on! What is your definition of will? Something that has no causation? Of course our will is caused, by instincts based on natural needs: food, sex, group bonds, in the aspiration to dignity, improvement and solidarity.
Quite the opposite: that what we experience as will is actually an after-the-fact event that occurs after a decision is already made in the brain as a consequence of how it synthesizes different instincts and stimuli.
Anytime you think to yourself "I'm going to do this", that decision was already made before you were even aware of it.
> We're not free in a vacuum, but free to decide what means lead more effectively to goals and a personality that are given to us.
What does that mean? Do you have any evidence that, given the same circumstances, I could have chosen to do something differently? Or it is just a bunch of hypothetical navel-gazing?
The Stanford encyclopedia link is a great read.
Yes you do.
which implies some kind of unmoored Cartesian ego selecting one alternative or another
"Implies". Hmmm... no. You're stubbornly insisting in the wrong mental frame that muds the waters, where the self is outside nature. That's a relic of religious thought. That vision has no support from science at all.
Quite the opposite: that what we experience as will is actually an after-the-fact event
That doesn't follow my question, just returned to your absurd premises and described what you think it happens based on them.
What does that mean?
We're not free in a vacuum means that we don't get to choose that we like food, sex or games. It means that we get to choose our behaviour to feed, have sex or play at different times or delay gratification to optimize satisfaction for our whishes.
Actually we're also free, to a certain extent, to change ourselves, to refine our tastes, to train our body, to increase our will power observing how it works and controling our reactions predicting them.
Do you have any evidence that, given the same circumstances, I could have chosen to do something differently?
The same circumstances!!! Do you realize how absurd is what you're asking for? So freedom for you consist in the ability to contradict nature laws? No wonder you think it doesn't exist.
The Stanford encyclopedia link is a great read.
Fine, you're not going to get bored.
That's still tautological. What does it mean to choose? What is the "I" that is doing the choosing? Those are the crucial questions that underpin the whole idea which you aren't explaining.
Even taking what you said at face value, almost every animal exihbits this behavior. Do all animals have free will? And what makes these a free choice? If you're saying that, assuming I have food and sex readily available, and I choose food, that I could have chosen otherwise given the same circumstances?
> So freedom for you consist in the ability to contradict nature laws? No wonder you think it doesn't exist.
Of course not. I'm merely restating the problem.
From here it seems that you're being deliberately obtuse. You reply to a phrase in my comment without considering the thread of questions and answers that led to it and ignoring the rest of the comment where I previously answered the very same question.
The "crucial" questions have no interest at all. I use the terms in their common colloquial sense. There's no explanation needed: we are intelligent animals, complex machines that select the options that we perceive as more favourable for us and reject the worse ones. Choosing is the fact that we selected lemon ice cream instead of orange ice cream. "I" means the 80 kg of biomass, the brain in particular, that is typing this comment.
Do all animals have free will? And what makes these a free choice?
Freedom is the absence of obstacles. Compared to humans, animals have a more limited set of choices, a lot more obstacles to overcome and less understanding of what they are and who they are. So they're less free.
If you're saying that, assuming I have food and sex readily available, and I choose food, that I could have chosen otherwise given the same circumstances?
Again? You asked for a definition of choosing and it's you who's mixing two different concepts to reach confusing conclusions.
"Giving the same circumstances" is the trap. If I get to choose food or sex, the outcome will depend on my tastes and the circumstances: Do I like the sex partner? Had I any sex in the last month or year? Am I really hungry? Do I like that food? Is it any good?
Freedom means that if presented with an attractive partner and disgusting food I can choose sex. Nobody forces me to do what I don't want to do. Your frame is so absurd that you try it to mean the opposite: that I'm free to eat disgusting food instead of having sex with an nice attractive woman.
We're not "free from ourselves", we're free (or not) from external interference. We weren't free to choose our rising environment and once the circumstances of it internalize, that's part of us and our will.
That's very different from what most people when they say "I", because they're thinking of their ego, the little voice narrating to them their thoughts. If you're willing to reduce "I" to this definition, then yes, that solves a lot of problems.
> "Giving the same circumstances" is the trap. If I get to choose food or sex, the outcome will depend on my tastes and the circumstances: Do I like the sex partner? Had I any sex in the last month or year? Am I really hungry? Do I like that food? Is it any good?
The reason I asked the question was to pin down the variant of compatibilism you were subscribing to. You seem to be effectively arguing for a minimalist compatibilist view.
When you say things like:
> Freedom means that if presented with an attractive partner and disgusting food I can choose sex. Nobody forces me to do what I don't want to do.
> We're not "free from ourselves", we're free (or not) from external interference. We weren't free to choose our rising environment and once the circumstances of it internalize, that's part of us and our will.
You are redefining the definitions of "free" and "will" such that of course it is obviously compatible with determinism, because you have (rightly) watered down the words "freedom" and "will" until they were much, much weaker than most people who believe in free will at all. It doesn't make much sense to call it free will anymore, at that point. And that's what my original post was about: I prefer to call a spade a spade, while some compatibilists prefer to argue down from the old superstitions until they rationalize the history of thought down to an approximation of reality, and still call that by the old "free will" term.
Politics. Any question that has remotely been associated with different ideologies, religions or any other polarizing groups division is bound to provoke this kind of reaction.
Free will is associated with religion, so non-religious people tend to oppose to the idea.
Actually I believe that religion is in the origin of the no free will conception.
Nature vs nurture is another of such debates. I'd add a few more, but enough of making friends for today :-)
If a robot went around killing people with an axe, we would stop it and dismantle it. We wouldn't shrug out shoulders and say "The robot can't help it so we can't hold it accountable for what it's doing."
If an individual does something to break the law, we hold that individual accountable for it. There are tons of modifiers, maybe the individual was under the influence of drugs, maybe the individual was mentally challenged, etc. These things modify how we hold the individual accountable.
Now, since we have cleared out what a "choice" is and there is no more argument about that, it is easy to show that frontal cortex output is determined by input that are prior experience (or electrical signals coming in), genetics (how it reacts to them and how it is initially wired) and chemical environment (drugs/hormones/others). So there's no room for any kind of free will.
So as you see there is no conflict between lack of free will and morals/ethics. We just need to accept that your frontal cortex is "YOU" and if it produced defective output (a crime for example), it has to be punished regardless of predetermination to do so. And accept that it is ETHICAL and MORAL to do that. That is all.
We really don't.
The author of the article has written off hundreds of years of philosophical debate about determinist free will versus indeterminism and decided that his interpretation of free will, which falls firmly in the causal indeterminism camp, is the right way to think about things. Admittedly that's the nice one, because determinism is hard when it comes to things like ethics and morality, but we don't need to redefine 'free will' to have the discussion. Especially when it's a low redefinition[1].
The fact is whether or not we have free will is largely irrelevant. There's a really interesting Philosophy Bites podcast with Daniel Dennett about what's important in the free will question[2]. It's well worth a listen if you're interested in philosophical stuff.
[1] http://www.fallacyfiles.org/redefine.html
[2] http://traffic.libsyn.com/philosophybites/Daniel_Dennett_on_...