Yes, you can set things up on the server side so that it hits a static page instead of your web application. But you can do that with the JS-based solution too: have it send you to a login page with a signed query-parameter or similar, and verify that query parameter in the web server configuration. If it fails / doesn't exist, deliver a static site that includes the necessary JS to do the login.
Your web server will need to verify a signature or MAC there, but this is way less attack surface than the usual client-cert processing code in SSL stacks (which processes untrusted keys and signatures). Removing that code will be an equal or greater security win.
Basically, if there is interest in engineering a good application-level solution instead of relying on the transport-level one, it can absolutely be done. (I do freely admit there isn't anything that can be used out-of-the-box today, to my knowledge.)
But in any case, I'm not sure I understand the threat model of that. The <keygen> service will already sign any public key that gets to it past authentication, so if you're worried about client attacks, that's already a problem. There's no distinction between compromising an existing private key and getting a new, unauthorized private key signed. You're already requiring that the site be secure against these attacks.
Obviously you don't store this in storage accessible to every relying website; you just store it in the origin of the authentication service itself, and have it generate signed messages (either client-side or server-side) that get passed to the relying websites.
(I've even heard of people looking at polyfilling client certs with an implementation based on WebCrypto and localStorage.)