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Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by anon4327733 on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @09:38PM (#10343672)
I don't quite understand the point concerning executable downloads and comparing hashes. Yes, comparing a hash found on a file downloaded from mozilla.com and a hash also on mozilla.com is stupid. However comparing a hash on mozilla.com and a download/torrent from an untrusted source seems to be valid and useful. The only attack vector in that case is at mozilla.com and not the download source.
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by nadams on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @10:55PM (#10343958)
I recall a story about an infected version of qemu (might have happened to other software) for Windows. Basically they hacked the site, replaced the binaries with infected ones AND updated the hashes.

I also recall one or two stories where the binaries were infected but the hashes not updated - this was obviously caught pretty quickly and fixed.

However, I remember a time when Firefox served downloads directly from their mirrors. This case could be good for comparing hashes - but now it looks like they use Amazon's cloudfront.

But yes - for the average guy generating a hash for your releases (where your release and hash comes from the same server) doesn't provide any real benefit.

Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by MichaelGG on Wednesday October 07, 2015 @12:22AM (#10344171)
Running it through VirusTotal is neat, as it'll tell you when it has first seen a file. If the file is old enough and the hash has been seen for a long time then it makes it less likely to be a fake. (Unless you think e.g. Mozilla has been compromised for a long time.)
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by sarciszewski on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @09:43PM (#10343691)
> I don't quite understand the point concerning executable downloads and comparing hashes.

Downloading a file from Server A and checking the hash delivered by Server A is security theater. In this case, only a digital signature (with a pre-established public key that you already trust) can really stop the server from being compromised (or malicious).

Downloading a file/torrent from Server B and verifying the hash delivered by Server A is a different situation entirely, and that boils down to a trust decision. Do you trust Server A to not be compromised? Do you trust them to not be malicious or in cahoots with Server B? If not, at the very least it's probably a larger attack service than the previous scenario. (Trusting the public key for the digital signature is also a trust decision. Only the details are different.)

Basically: If you're going to do anything at all, verifying hashes from the same source is a waste of CPU and human effort.

I hope that helps at all.

Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by haberman on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @10:00PM (#10343761)
You made exactly the same point as the post you are replying to, you just used more words.
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by sarciszewski on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @10:13PM (#10343811)
I wasn't really trying to argue, they said they didn't understand the point.
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by haberman on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @10:26PM (#10343870)
They didn't understand why the article says that comparing hashes is "a completely ludicrous waste of time." In some cases, it's not (as you both mentioned).
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by meowface on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @10:25PM (#10343865)
Re-read their post. I think you probably didn't understand their point. :)
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by sarciszewski on Tuesday October 06, 2015 @11:28PM (#10344064)
That's certainly possible. I'm not seeing what I missed. Maybe if I sleep on it, it will be clearer?
Re:Basic Cryptography Concepts for Developers by sarciszewski on Wednesday October 07, 2015 @01:38AM (#10344343)
I've updated the article to make the context (and consequences) a bit clearer. I'm sorry for wording that part so weirdly before.