I think desktop-style devices are going more in the direction of being personal. And where they aren't, probably in the majority of cases you don't want the OS to mediate access poorly. I'm not saying that there aren't any counterexamples, though.
What you say about running processes "on behalf of you" is really quite interesting. There is no reason you should trust the application programmer to get it right, yet that's what the OS currently gives -- you can run your db as user "db" and httpd as user "httpd", but it doesn't do much good in terms of the actual user. So, some radical thinking is required. The editor of ;login: actually tried to point me in the direction you mention when we were working on the article, but I couldn't formulate clear enough thoughts on the subject to include in the article. Maybe someone else here has already thought about it and can put it into writing?
For many people you're probably right. I do think that there's tremendous value in segmenting out one's various personæ. There's no particularly good reason why I should give a binary game blob access to the same user data that contains my financial data, passwords &c.
A finer-grained system would be nice, no doubt, but OS users are pretty time-tested.
> Maybe someone else here has already thought about it and can put it into writing?
Well, in principle capabilities systems can do a lot of this already. As myself, I can give a capability to a server, and it can use that capability to execute work on my behalf; once I've received the result, I can (presumably) revoke that capability. Capabilities can even be used to implement filesystems: my process might have a filesystem root capability, which permits it to see a single directory, which is itself a list of capabilities to directories and files, &c. Pretty neat stuff.
There's been some interesting work with capabilities done in EROS, its successor Coyotos & Tahoe-LAFS.
I skimmed your thesis—really interesting work!
Mmmhmm. From what I understand, Android runs each Android application on the system as its own user and handles application permissions by making each permission its own group. Linux's user isolation is pretty good.
Other than lack of manpower and lack of interest, there's no reason why a Linux distro couldn't put in the medium-to-large amount of work it would take to make wrappers to do similar things for their most popular Linux applications. :)
Android runs Android applications each as a different Linux user.
I think the last two paragraphs of "Conclusions" are the most interesting part of the thesis.
No, because HN comments are public and the only reason to share data with Facebook is to make it available to (some) other people. It might be interesting for Dropbox or Google Drive, but even for Google Drive, the killer app and value-add over Microsoft Office is realtime collaboration with (specific) other users.
> Even on the desktop, the square peg is not the correct shape: we know that the system will be used by a single person and that the system does not need to protect the user from non-existent other users.
I don't know if this is really true. Many desktops are shared (e.g. by members of a family). And of course data centre machines are shared by multiple users, although often those users are all using processes operating using the same OS credentials.
Wouldn't it be interesting if processes running on my behalf within Facebook or HN couldn't access other users' private data, rather than relying on the programmers at FB or HN to get it right?