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A comment on Predicting and controlling NetHack's randomness (2009). Parent comment

Re:Predicting and controlling NetHack's randomness (2009) by wolf550e on Saturday October 03, 2015 @02:38PM (#10324897)
You can use 24 bytes of "true" randomness (16 for key and 8 for nonce) and then get 2^64 16-byte blocks of randomness before re-keying at better than 1Gbps per core using AESNI. How much more do you need?

EDIT: How is what I wrote wrong?

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Re:Predicting and controlling NetHack's randomness (2009) by tptacek on Saturday October 03, 2015 @04:35PM (#10325244)
It's not wrong, and I didn't downvote you, but I'm not sure we need to concede that anything more difficult than "read numbers from /dev/urandom" is required here. :)
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