People find privilege escalation bugs in the Linux kernel often enough that you can't really claim that running arbitrary native code is "secure" unless you're doing something to mitigate these. Things like:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/07/22/7
Note that SELinux won't do anything about this kind of bug. You have to use seccomp and similar to disable large swaths of the Linux kernel API, particularly exotic parts that aren't well-tested or reviewed.
https://docs.sandstorm.io/en/latest/developing/security-prac...
Admittedly, though, "only minimal modification" is probably too much modification for Docker's goals. That's fair. But I don't think that gives them a pass to pretend the problem doesn't exist.
To paraphrase Theo de Raadt:
‟You are absolutely deluded, if not stupid, if you think that a worldwide collection of software engineers who can’t write operating systems or applications without security holes, can then turn around and suddenly write virtualization layers without security holes.”
[1] http://blog.valbonne-consulting.com/2015/04/14/as-a-goat-im-...
https://blog.docker.com/2013/08/containers-docker-how-secure... concludes,
"Docker containers are, by default, quite secure; especially if you take care of running your processes inside the containers as non-privileged users (i.e. non root)."
They also recommend using SELinux with Docker to beef up security (see https://blog.docker.com/2014/07/new-dockercon-video-docker-s...)
As long as people are using containers as a security boundary it makes sense to pay attention to things like this one about the control socket.