Getting caught is a failure. A bomb exploding is a victory.
There is a practically limitless supply of shmucks out there for AQ to weaponize. All they have to do is get better at converting them. What evidence do we have that this will be a long-term operational problem for AQ? Everything I see indicates that they will get better at it, not worse.
This is also why they aren't shutting down traffic lights. A failed attempt to shut down traffic lights wins nothing. Nobody is viscerally afraid of darkened traffic lights. In fact, until it happens, nobody is going to be viscerally afraid of someone taking out the grid. But everyone is afraid in their gut of exploding planes. Just the threat --- just 5% of the threat --- is enough to wreak havoc.
Building the system has a high cost. Using the system to exploit the dumbfucks who get captured by the system in order to get them to put the explosive underpants on is cheap.
If the system was jeopardized by any terrorist attempt, you'd be right. But it isn't. It's like spam. It may have a 0.001% conversion rate, but as long as it pays off 10000000:1, it's sustainable and resilient.
There just aren't that many jihadists that will be allowed to fly without a lot of careful screening anymore.
Particularly after international airlines now have some experience with patting down and inconveniencing _all_ of their customers as a result of missing the christmas underwear bomber - there is now a pretty good incentive for them to start being cautious about those who were in gray area previously. No more gray area - if there are doubts (I.E. you are on the TIDE list) - you get checked carefully.
All AQ has to do is get better at taking mentally unstable people from unstable parts of the world and pointing them in the right direction. 90% of them will fail. Hell, 99%. But the 1% that succeed will make us react horribly to the other 99%.
Perhaps even most fanatics and angry unstable people prefer to shoot at soldiers than take a 99-in-100 chance of winding up in infidel custody, famous only in failure.
'The term "Jihad" used without any qualifiers is generally understood in the West to be referring to holy war on behalf of Islam.'
What I'm trying to state is that the number of individuals who have radicalized to the point at which they will blow themselves up AND are authorized to fly on the American Aviation system, are few and far between. Even the christmas underwear bomber had been reported to both the CIA and State Department. If they had simply taken the father at his word "My Son is radicalized islamist and has a Visa which permits him to fly into the USA" they would have put him onto a list of selective screening and a bit of an extra pat-down, if not revoked his Visa in the same manner as the UK.
You can be certain that the TIDE list is going to be aggressively reviewed, and the list of 14,000 or so people currently targeted for selective screening is going to grow dramatically in the next few months.
They really need to make this a list of names/photos instead of just a list of names. The idea that we can target terrorists with a 'no-fly list' based entirely off of someone's name and not the mugshot is absurd.
While a one-in-a-twenty chance of success sounds good from a terror chief's perspective, no suicide bomber wants a 95% chance of winding up in captivity, famous only as a failure. Out of the twenty, they want to be the one!
So plans that allocate many participants to expected capture will have far fewer volunteers. And every report of a capture will decrease potential-volunteers' willingness to sign up, because they will adjust upward their expectation of embarrassing capture rather than martyrdom.
There's also a tradeoff between their naivete and effectiveness: a bumpkin who's never traveled internationally might believe whatever his handlers tell him, but is also more likely to draw suspicion or otherwise foul the mission.
But I don't think this applies:
Training a terrorist has a cost, and he should succeed the "fate of any individual terrorist is not irrelevant". The terrorist group does not have an infinite number of terrorists (as he correctly concedes in the next paragraph).So random screening works, not because that influences the behavior even of those who aren't checked, but because makes executing the attack more expensive to overcome the possibility of being detained in the random test.
Of course random screening is not as good as full screening, but from a realistic point of view is the only thing you can apply without shutting down world economy.