Re:A password hash storage scheme that prevents efficient pa...
by saurik on Thursday September 17, 2015 @12:07AM
(#10231522)
Limiting logins per IP address is a luxury that cannot be afforded by developers of applications targetting some Eastern countries or which are expected to be primarily used by mobile devices, due to pervasive usage of NAT and shared IP addresses. You are simply trading one form of DoS for another :/.
Re:A password hash storage scheme that prevents efficient pa...
by gkanapathy on Thursday September 17, 2015 @12:10AM
(#10231531)
Seems like it should be possible to rate limit failed logins, and of course failed logins on a per-account basis.
Re:A password hash storage scheme that prevents efficient pa...
by balls187 on Thursday September 17, 2015 @01:05AM
(#10231672)
Failed logins, yes. However What the original comment was getting at scrypt would in effect, reduce the number of simultaneous login requests a server can handle, so legitimate usage could bog the server down.
Re:A password hash storage scheme that prevents efficient pa...
by zkhalique on Thursday September 17, 2015 @03:29AM
(#10232055)
Either way, how are you going to rate-limit failed logins while at the same time not allowing a DDOS of a user login? If I am using a botnet to keep trying passwords for Sarah Palin, how are you going to know when the real Sarah Palin logs in from a new computer? Sarah Palin will never be able to log in again from a new computer, unless she uses a key from her old one.
Re:A password hash storage scheme that prevents efficient pa...
by Ntrails on Thursday September 17, 2015 @06:08AM
(#10232470)
I would assume that you'd simply do (increasing) timed lockout periods by user/ip combination.
At some point you have to accept that administrators will need to do some work, and if 200 IPs are trying to log into the same account 5 times every 15 minutes you should probably email the user and lock the account.
Re:A password hash storage scheme that prevents efficient pa...
by leni536 on Thursday September 17, 2015 @03:20AM
(#10232023)
>per account
Nobody stops an attacker to use a fixed password and cycle the username. If your site has lots of users this could work pretty well. Your site could even "leak" (like forums) usernames making this approach more efficient.
'Server relief' is dumb... correctly implementing a 'hashcash'-like scheme to prevent excessive CPU resource commitment is non-trivial. It will require either persistent pre-login server state, and/or cryptographic IP/session binding, both of which open up a second DoS vector.
Implementing Scrypt etc in the browser doesn't completely prevent DoS, and sacrifices your ability as an operator to ensure passwords are being appropriately salted and munged (because of third party clients, unauthorised API users etc). Plus, attackers can just start using malicious webpages or botnets to crowdsource their hashing efforts which, because it scales horizontally, could actually speed things up for an attacker if you're server isnt doing any rate-limiting on the final hash+authentication stage.