What the hell are you talking about? It's a game.
> In a scenario where users can access elements of a joint array of requested size without limitations, they can access memory outside the array
Welcome to modern computing! A process can access any part of its mapped address space without limitation. Joke aside, are you suggesting a process should hide memory from itself? Forget it, I can't even make sense out of your comment.
> Memory block's total requested size may overflow size_t
Are you serious? Then please suggest a fix for C, C++, Java, and whatsnot, because nothing will prevent you in pretty much any language to ask for more memory than you can handle. This is not a _bug_, it's just expecting the programmer not to fuck around.
Here's an example with a better description: https://www.verisign.com/en_US/security-services/security-in...
>(...) could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the current user.
>The vulnerability occurs when reading the header of the Pack200 compressed Jar file during decompression. To calculate the size of a heap buffer, the code multiplies and adds several 32-bit integers. The bounds of these values are not checked, and the arithmetic operations can overflow. This results in an undersized buffer being allocated, which leads to a heap-based buffer overflow.
I remember there was a similar bug in some other decompression library.
In a scenario where users can access elements of a joint array of requested size without limitations, they can access memory outside the array. Memory block's total requested size may overflow size_t. Fortunately, overflow prevention is easy to add to the generic version.