The crazy thing about LTCM, and the thing that everybody overlooks is that LTCM didn't die by bankruptcy...they died because of the systemic risk of their portfolio size and the subsequent intervention from the federal reserve. They had $100B under management, but only lost $5B in 4 months. It was a major catastrophe, sure, but it was only major because of the implications from its absolute size. A 5% drop in 4 months is something that can be recovered from on a personal portfolio level or even a small hedge fund level...but at LTCM's size it was endangering the financial system as a whole because it was threatening to bankrupt overleveraged institutional investors.
Jane Street Capital, while very opaque about what they do, has given me enough room to believe that LTCM has inspired a lot of their strategy. This always makes others perceive me as a quack that doesn't like history, but if another LTCM came around that was using the same strategy but on a much smaller scale and with a well spelled-out liquidation strategy, I would invest. In fact, I would probably bet big on it (>50% of my portfolio).
Nobody is gonna touch it though, because everybody is so conservative in finance. "We're gonna follow LTCM's strategy" isn't a sales pitch, it's a punch line. But outside of finance, there is a ton of precedent for monumental successes with an idea that has failed before. And I think LTCM is one of those ideas.
The math people (Merton, Scholes) saw the craziness, pulled enough of their money out in time, and didn't lose it. The finance people (first and foremost Merriwether) were those who believed they are smarted than everyone and went bankrupt.
They did not use math at the time they lost money. They were were essentially gambling (doing "risk arbitrage", which is all risk and no arbitrage).