I honestly don't know. I'd always assumed that all of that happened well before I was born, but never bothered looking for any exact dates. It's just something I've always been exposed to, and have always taken the importance of falsification as a given.
A quick search turns up this[1] from Wikipedia:
"In work beginning in the 1930s, Popper gave falsifiability a renewed emphasis as a criterion of empirical statements in science."
OTOH, the entry on Popper at Plato[2] says this:
"However, in the 1970's a series of papers published by researchers such as Miller, Tichý, and Grünbaum in particular revealed fundamental defects in Popper's formal definitions of verisimilitude."
which suggest that his work had achieved enough signficance by the 1970's that other people were basing work on it (and in this case, perhaps refuting bits of it).
The idea of falsification suffers from three issues: (1) it's binary true or false (2) it's asymmetric (falsifying a theory T vs falsifying the theory not T) and (3) it's kind of vague what constitutes falsification. Bayesian incorporation of evidence into beliefs arguably gives a superior solution to the problem, and Laplace (1749 - 1827) was already fully aware of this.
I don't know the exact history, but I suspect that people were doing quantitative science before we developed a good grasp of statistics.
Also, both Kuhn and Popper endeavored to describe science as it was already being done.
My parents, both scientists educated in the 1950s, never heard of them. They followed a pretty simplistic notion of scientific methodology, that mainly revolved around intellectual honesty: Report everything that you observe, and be willing to change your beliefs when confronted with new information.
I never heard of Popper or Kuhn until after I finished my science degree, and then, only in the context of debates about evolution versus creationism. But I don't know if I'm typical or not.