UBI has complicated secondary effects. Some of them can be contradictory. One who gets welfare would have disincentive to work because of the loss of benefits in today's govt programs. UBI may spur some (not all) of them to join the workforce. However, another scenario is the mass populations of part-time workers earning mininum wage ($7.25) that total less than $11k a year. That's ~1500 hours of lost labor hours for those who are perfectly fine with not making more than UBI's $11k.
It's definitely not as simple as saying, "UBI only creates incentives to work and never any disincentives, and GDP can only go up or stay the same instead of down."
The bigger problem is that the economy might not yet be able to sustain a level at which UBI isn't substantially worse for the neediest populations than existing support programs -- increasing capacity through automation will get us there eventually, but its far from clear we're there now.
Which is why, while I think UBI is a great idea to adopt and phase in, I don't think a big-bang short-term conversion is a good idea.
[0] unless it is pegged to inflation, then if its set initially in a bad place, its stuck there. So, if you are going to index it rather than manually adjust it, don't index it to inflation, index it to output/revenue measures, not price levels.
Also, "lost labor hours" in what fields..? Reduced labor hours would not necessarily suggest reduced economic output, or a reduction in construction projects, or small business experiments.
UBI doesn't create a disincentive to work, UBI replacing means-tested programs eliminates a disincentive to work.
> and/or hiring costs for low-wage (now medium-to-high wage) to skyrocket.
Why would hiring costs skyrocket? The elimination of the perverse incentives of means-tested programs should drive down low-end hiring costs.