Re:Windows Certificate Manager does not display the complete...
by geographomics on Sunday August 30, 2015 @02:33PM
(#10144116)
They are transmitted over an unencrypted channel, but the CTL files themselves (authroot.stl and disallowedcert.stl) are signed by Microsoft so it's fine. Any modification in transit can be detected and presumably will cause them not to be updated.
Re:Windows Certificate Manager does not display the complete...
by Animats on Sunday August 30, 2015 @03:31PM
(#10144248)
So an attacker could return an old "disallowedcert.stl" to re-activate a revoked cert?
Re:Windows Certificate Manager does not display the complete...
by geographomics on Sunday August 30, 2015 @05:08PM
(#10144484)
It would be interesting to try. There's a sequence number in the CTL which could prevent this type of attack, but I don't know if it's actually checked against that which is currently stored.
How difficult it is to hijack the link between the local and remote certificate stores? That's a potential attack surface. It's not hard-coded; it's a registry key (Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\AuthRoot\AutoUpdate). The default URL is "ctldl.windowsupdate.com".
So what protects that domain from being hijacked via DNS poisoning? It ought to have a valid SSL cert, right? Well, no. Go to "https://ctldl.windowsupdate.com/":
Uh oh. Am I missing something, or are root certs downloaded over an unsecured channel?