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Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by saurik on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @06:32AM (#10122079)
You have overlooked the CPU cost. Given that most memory objects already have at least an over-approximate size somewhere, and how we are more than happy to annotate stacks with canaries, I really don't think anyone is as concerned with the memory cost of adding a size to every array as the CPU cost of adding a read and compare to every array access.
Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by renox on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @09:02AM (#10122573)
I think that the CPU cost could be reduced if the CPU had some kind of instruction for array access: if you 'hardcode' that an 'array' has its address stored in register Rx and its length stored in Rx+1, you can easily have an instruction "checked_load Ry <- Rx, <index>" this instruction can have a latency similar to a normal load instruction as it could check the value of the index with Rx+1 in parallel to the load (1).

And if you have a 'load aligned double word' instruction which load two consecutive word in Rx and Rx+1 (aligned to avoid the thorny issue of page missing in the middle of an instruction), you can reduce the cost of having to manage both the array address and its length.

Sure this isn't free: more registers used, more cache used, still it doesn't look THAT bad from a performance POV no? Or very complex to implement. Is-there something I'm not understanding?

1: and if the checks fails there is TRAP executed, which is compatible with C/C++ semantic.

Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by rnovak on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @11:27AM (#10123557)
I think the problem a lot of people would have is that introducing hardware, which costs millions to design and bring to market, when it's possible to write code that isn't prone to overflow....just doesn't seem like a good idea.

When I was in school, my professor for CPU Architecture had a good saying: "If you're going down to NAND gates to debug your software you're doing something wrong".

I think another issue is that arrays, trees, and other structures are a complete abstraction. The CPU doesn't need to know a thing about them for them to work, because all it actually sees is addresses and instructions (I get that I'm grossly oversimplifying things), and so introducing that type of "check" at the hardware level is pushing the abstraction down, and I don't think that's a good idea either.

But I do think that's one of the great reasons for using a higher level language, where there are array bounds checks, etc.

To me, C/C++ is like "pretty" assemby language (Now with new features like Undefined Behavior!!!), and I like that about it. But I'm not sure how other people feel.

Anyways, that's just my take on it, take it with a grain of salt.

Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by ctz on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @07:20AM (#10122191)
Intel is adding hardware array bounds checking called MPX in skylake, so this could become a reality.
Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by tedunangst on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @11:08AM (#10123379)
There already was a BOUND instruction. Nobody ever seems to remember this when they propose adding such an instruction.
Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by cm2187 on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @07:35AM (#10122233)
I presume it would only be used for code compiled for skylake?
Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by cm2187 on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @06:54AM (#10122123)
I am not necessarily suggesting checking array boundaries on every array access, but at least providing an easy and safe way to refer to the array size.

Array boundary checking is I think desirable but I can understand that for some applications it is an unacceptable performance hit.

Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by seanwilson on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @08:05AM (#10122330)
> Array boundary checking is I think desirable but I can understand that for some applications it is an unacceptable performance hit.

Given the severe potential security implications for not using it, enabling bounds checking is a sensible default in my opinion. People always mention the speed of C for example but ignore what is being sacrificed for it.

Re:How security flaws work: the buffer overflow by wslh on Wednesday August 26, 2015 @08:46AM (#10122499)