Indeed, totally not practical.
First, it is a very impressive paper that got into the flagship conference. It presents and solves an intriguing puzzle.
The implied attacker model: you are safe unless your packet traverses an unsafe country. Wrong in my opinion (RFC 7258).
As a scientist I've seen this over-and-over again. No healthy scientific community exists around privacy. SIGCOMM-like venue want novel/crazy ideas. We known onion routing works to a large extend. However, it is a career/tenure killer to work on that. No grants. No citations.
I don't understand why this is true: my crooked peer can route both ways if you have some other way of 'checking' on my routing. Or I can be right next to you and pretend to be in Asia by offering bad GPS coordinates and auto-lagging my response times. No?
I think the idea is that you can't go through Omaha and have a router in Asia saying that it handled your data within the time constraints.