No, the answer includes better tech. OpenSSH and LibreSSL are doing good work in removing insecure codecs. HTTP/2 looks like it should do well, because no client implementation accepts plaintext. I’m hoping that protocols like OTR and Darkmail become more widespread.
PGP is basically unusable. You can use it to dump secrets on journalists, after you have trained the journalist. You can’t use it to lead a quiet, private life. I tried. It’s not integrated with anything, and nobody else uses it. It’s fatally flawed.
Being riddled with fatal flaws is an aspect PGP shares with the lucrative Certificate Authority system, with S/MIME, with the DNS security system, with IPsec, with cell phone encryption.
Worse, actual solutions are orthogonal to big business interests. Decentralized trust? Google has no need for this; Google has its own intermediate CA (which, through the totally broken CA model, means Google can issue valid TLS and S/MIME certificated for any domain in the world). Federated content sharing? Facebook has no need for this; Facebook needs all your data to keep it safe for you, and also to analyze and monetize it.
What we need is to follow the article’s plea: Truly understand that the network is hostile, and design our systems to make security the easy default. And drop insecure protocols already, wherever there is a viable alternative.
All you would need for this is to model each user's interaction with the system as a statement, where a statement could be either code or data, and then sign and encrypt these statements by default and encrypt the statement's decryption key with recipients' public keys as needed.
This might sound esoteric but we could already do this today just by taking something like Unison [1] and adding this encryption layer.
As geeks we should really own up to the fact that it's perfectly feasible to do this... and get working on it.
P.S. For a fun fact; at it's core such a language would pretty much be what John McCarthy described as 'the language for the year 2015.' [2]
[1] http://unisonweb.org [2] http://lambda-the-ultimate.org/node/3180
It's integrated with Thunderbird via Enigmail. It works at least as well as MS Outlook's integrated message signing. If your reply to that is something like "Everyone uses webmail.", I say "I've been using IMAP to access Gmail since five minutes after the feature was added to Gmail.".
This[0] seems to indicate that the only email client that has real problems with attached signatures is Outlook Express. I can't bring myself to care much about Outlook Express users. (Is OE even installed on Windows 7 and later?)
The bigger problems are that it’s not integrated and it’s not effective for shielding metadata. With difficulty and being mindful of the sharp edges, you can use OpenPGP on desktop. You need a clunky third-party email client to get it on mobile. Best case scenario, you send lots of extra data that gets ignored. Worst case, all those attached signatures get downloaded as files, causing confusion and anger. And there’s no interoperability with S/MIME, which actually is supported by most proprietary email clients.
OpenPGP does not protect metadata. It piggybacks on SMTP, which publishes the sender, recipient, and subject line in the clear, along with the identity and timing of each server in the transport path from when you send the email to when it lands in your recipient’s mailbox. PGP was originally conceived as the “envelope” to protect your message contents, but in this era of unlimited surveillance we need to do better.
"Why aren't we doing this now?" Probably for the same reasons that we're going back to the 1990's world of Instant Messaging walled gardens; techies and cypherpunks are winning some battles but not most of them, and non-technical users don't understand what they give up when they choose a centralized Web and ISPs that make them incapable of acting as a peer on The Internet. [0]
To the rest of your comment:
To the best of my knowledge, I've never had Enigmail or Thunderbird mangle my PGP signatures. I participate in a few technical mailing lists; the folks there absolutely would tell me if my signatures were getting fucked up. For mail that doesn't go to these lists, I can double-check the message copied to my sent mail folder. :)
Installation of Enigmail on Windows, Linux and -I presume- Mac is trivial. Based on reports, the sharp edges that you speak of appear to be there; send only plaintext email and attach -rather than inline- your signature and you will -in my experience- avoid all of them.
The world of mobile software is largely a cesspool. Maybe I'm ignorant, but it seems like the only folks doing good privacy protection mobile software are Open Whisper Systems, the Tor Foundation (by way of Orbot), and Whatsapp. (The Whatsapp folks are in this list because of the work that Open Whisper Systems did to integrate TextSecure's near-zero-effort crypto into Whatsapp's software.)
[0] Yes, I totally understand that almost no one in the US has a real choice in ISP. Even here in Silicon Valley, I find myself prevented at every turn from giving my money to local, independent ISPs. There's a little comfort in the fact that Comcast allocates and routes up to a /60, and performs very, very little inbound filtering.
which fatal flaws are present in "IPsec"?
The important thing to worry is that once some lawmaking passes and and journalists will happily announce the legal battle's won and the spies won't spy anymore (ha!) most will be happy about this, and continue to ignore any technical issues. That is, stay easy targets until the next scandal.
Both technical and legal solutions are important. We just can't ditch one and say that it's not important anymore - neither works well without the other.
But eventually, it may be necessary to get serious about steganography. With pervasive streaming HD video, covert channels providing even 0.1% of throughput would be workable. The harder challenge would be plausible deniability. If the steganography fails and that SWAT team arrives, you want them to discover that you've been compromised by covert-channel botnets. Just like every other user and server on the Internet.
But yes, it's complicated. I've been writing how-to guides for years, and people's eyes do tend to glaze. Still, I'm sure that it could be automated.
Smartphones are the huge problem. They're intentionally designed for tracking and surveillance. And they are the primary channel for Internet access in many places. So it does seem pretty hopeless :(
You mean like how people can anonymously buy drugs on the internet? It's working fine. It's not perfect, but it doesn't have to be.
> Starting in April 2012, a DEA undercover agent in Maryland (the UC), began communicating with Ulbricht about selling illegal drugs on Silk Road. That agent was one of several assigned to the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. The UC claimed to be a smuggler who specialized in moving substantial quantities of illegal drugs. In December 2012, Ulbricht set out to find a drug dealer on Silk Road who could purchase large quantities of drugs from the UC and directed his administrators, including Green, to assist. Green assisted the UC to establish contact with a buyer, who was an established seller of drugs on Silk Road (the Vendor). The UC and the Vendor negotiated a deal for one kilogram of cocaine for approximately $27,000 in Bitcoin, a digital currency that has no association with a national government, is difficult to track, and easy to move online.
> Without the knowledge of either Ulbricht or the UC, Green agreed to act as a middle-man for the Vendor and take delivery of drugs. As a result, the Vendor provided Green’s address to the UC as the place to which the cocaine was to be delivered. On January 17, 2013, an undercover U.S. Postal Inspector delivered the cocaine [very highly cut] to Green at his residence. Shortly after Green accepted delivery of the cocaine, federal agents with the HSI, DEA, U.S. Postal Inspectors and the U.S. Secret Service executed a search warrant at Green’s residence and recovered the kilogram of cocaine. U.S. Secret Service agents also conducted a forensic examination of Green’s computers and digital media seized during the search.
[0] http://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/administrator-silk-road-we...
To outlaw but not make virtually anyone guilty (because some stuff like TLS is extremely common) is a hard task alone, and any attempts at this would be surely fiercely countered.
Here's what I'm trying to say: there's absolutely nothing that prevents the government from forcing you to grant them access to your private (i.e. encrypted) content. If they decide that you're a threat to national security, they can do whatever they please to gain access to anything you have secured.
Before you say "but it's technologically impossible!" let me remind you that in any system, humans are the weakest link. How long do you think you can last under torture? The CIA has hundreds of "secret sites" overseas. What makes you think that the Department of Homeland Security doesn't have any equivalents here in the US, that they can imprison you in and torture you until you reveal everything you know?
It's really naive to think that technology can solve all problems. Think outside the box (or the computer, in this case) and really try to grasp what the most powerful nation in the history of the world is capable of. They can force the private jets of foreign officials to land in allied airports and search them thoroughly. If you think your fileserver is safe simply because you have its contents encrypted, you have a lot to learn.
That's a very important point that I think many who champion technical solutions conveniently set aside. Remember that in the US in the 90s--in other words, not that long ago--PGP was illegal and Phil Zimmerman was criminally investigated for developing and distributing it.
Today PGP and GPG are some of the most powerful encryption tools we have available to us--tools that Snowden says we can still trust. If someone makes a better tool, or if these tools start to bother governments again, then governments could just declare them illegal. Then you're faced with the question of: "Do I encrypt my mail and risk a SWAT team blowing up my front door and shooting my dog, then spending hundreds of thousands of dollars in a protracted legal battle against the full might of the US government, or do I just forget about it?"
The tech genie is out of the bottle, and the answer isn't more tech--it's getting people, and thus governments, to understand and champion these tools just like we do.