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Re:The network is hostile by acabal on Sunday August 16, 2015 @07:28PM (#10070669)
> Because ultimately, no matter what technical solutions you can come up with force and law always trump those.

That's a very important point that I think many who champion technical solutions conveniently set aside. Remember that in the US in the 90s--in other words, not that long ago--PGP was illegal and Phil Zimmerman was criminally investigated for developing and distributing it.

Today PGP and GPG are some of the most powerful encryption tools we have available to us--tools that Snowden says we can still trust. If someone makes a better tool, or if these tools start to bother governments again, then governments could just declare them illegal. Then you're faced with the question of: "Do I encrypt my mail and risk a SWAT team blowing up my front door and shooting my dog, then spending hundreds of thousands of dollars in a protracted legal battle against the full might of the US government, or do I just forget about it?"

The tech genie is out of the bottle, and the answer isn't more tech--it's getting people, and thus governments, to understand and champion these tools just like we do.

Re:The network is hostile by Decade on Monday August 17, 2015 @01:47AM (#10071524)
The tech genie is out of the bottle, and the answer isn't more tech--it's getting people, and thus governments, to understand and champion these tools just like we do.

No, the answer includes better tech. OpenSSH and LibreSSL are doing good work in removing insecure codecs. HTTP/2 looks like it should do well, because no client implementation accepts plaintext. I’m hoping that protocols like OTR and Darkmail become more widespread.

PGP is basically unusable. You can use it to dump secrets on journalists, after you have trained the journalist. You can’t use it to lead a quiet, private life. I tried. It’s not integrated with anything, and nobody else uses it. It’s fatally flawed.

Being riddled with fatal flaws is an aspect PGP shares with the lucrative Certificate Authority system, with S/MIME, with the DNS security system, with IPsec, with cell phone encryption.

Worse, actual solutions are orthogonal to big business interests. Decentralized trust? Google has no need for this; Google has its own intermediate CA (which, through the totally broken CA model, means Google can issue valid TLS and S/MIME certificated for any domain in the world). Federated content sharing? Facebook has no need for this; Facebook needs all your data to keep it safe for you, and also to analyze and monetize it.

What we need is to follow the article’s plea: Truly understand that the network is hostile, and design our systems to make security the easy default. And drop insecure protocols already, wherever there is a viable alternative.

Re:The network is hostile by mtrimpe on Monday August 17, 2015 @05:07AM (#10071953)
Amen; I'm still flabbergasted by programmers not acknowledging that it's entirely possible to create a programming language which embeds our concept of privacy in cryptographic reality.

All you would need for this is to model each user's interaction with the system as a statement, where a statement could be either code or data, and then sign and encrypt these statements by default and encrypt the statement's decryption key with recipients' public keys as needed.

This might sound esoteric but we could already do this today just by taking something like Unison [1] and adding this encryption layer.

As geeks we should really own up to the fact that it's perfectly feasible to do this... and get working on it.

P.S. For a fun fact; at it's core such a language would pretty much be what John McCarthy described as 'the language for the year 2015.' [2]

[1] http://unisonweb.org [2] http://lambda-the-ultimate.org/node/3180

Re:The network is hostile by simoncion on Monday August 17, 2015 @08:24AM (#10072513)
> It’s not integrated with anything...

It's integrated with Thunderbird via Enigmail. It works at least as well as MS Outlook's integrated message signing. If your reply to that is something like "Everyone uses webmail.", I say "I've been using IMAP to access Gmail since five minutes after the feature was added to Gmail.".

Re:The network is hostile by Decade on Monday August 17, 2015 @01:29PM (#10074648)
Re:The network is hostile by simoncion on Monday August 17, 2015 @07:52PM (#10076832)
Noted. And, yeah, that sucks... a lot. However, my habit of always composing plain-text messages and exclusively using attached signatures seems to have inadvertently shielded me from those issues. :) It has been more than a year since that article; I wonder if those bugs have been cleaned up.

This[0] seems to indicate that the only email client that has real problems with attached signatures is Outlook Express. I can't bring myself to care much about Outlook Express users. (Is OE even installed on Windows 7 and later?)

[0] https://www.phildev.net/pgp/pgp_clear_vs_mime.html

Re:The network is hostile by Decade on Tuesday August 18, 2015 @03:16AM (#10077932)
That issue has been in the Thunderbird/Enigmail Rube Goldberg setup forever, and publicly discussed since at least 2006. Always, the response is, Don’t use Enigmail with HTML email. At this point, it would be bigger news if they manage to fix it, so I expect to be informed if it happens.

The bigger problems are that it’s not integrated and it’s not effective for shielding metadata. With difficulty and being mindful of the sharp edges, you can use OpenPGP on desktop. You need a clunky third-party email client to get it on mobile. Best case scenario, you send lots of extra data that gets ignored. Worst case, all those attached signatures get downloaded as files, causing confusion and anger. And there’s no interoperability with S/MIME, which actually is supported by most proprietary email clients.

OpenPGP does not protect metadata. It piggybacks on SMTP, which publishes the sender, recipient, and subject line in the clear, along with the identity and timing of each server in the transport path from when you send the email to when it lands in your recipient’s mailbox. PGP was originally conceived as the “envelope” to protect your message contents, but in this era of unlimited surveillance we need to do better.

Re:The network is hostile by simoncion on Tuesday August 18, 2015 @06:23AM (#10078376)
If we're concerned about metadata and timing analysis, we could use something like a Mixmaster, along with TLS-only connections between email servers and between the server and its clients. This would essentially be Tor for SMTP, with the recipient's email server as the "exit node".

"Why aren't we doing this now?" Probably for the same reasons that we're going back to the 1990's world of Instant Messaging walled gardens; techies and cypherpunks are winning some battles but not most of them, and non-technical users don't understand what they give up when they choose a centralized Web and ISPs that make them incapable of acting as a peer on The Internet. [0]

To the rest of your comment:

To the best of my knowledge, I've never had Enigmail or Thunderbird mangle my PGP signatures. I participate in a few technical mailing lists; the folks there absolutely would tell me if my signatures were getting fucked up. For mail that doesn't go to these lists, I can double-check the message copied to my sent mail folder. :)

Installation of Enigmail on Windows, Linux and -I presume- Mac is trivial. Based on reports, the sharp edges that you speak of appear to be there; send only plaintext email and attach -rather than inline- your signature and you will -in my experience- avoid all of them.

The world of mobile software is largely a cesspool. Maybe I'm ignorant, but it seems like the only folks doing good privacy protection mobile software are Open Whisper Systems, the Tor Foundation (by way of Orbot), and Whatsapp. (The Whatsapp folks are in this list because of the work that Open Whisper Systems did to integrate TextSecure's near-zero-effort crypto into Whatsapp's software.)

[0] Yes, I totally understand that almost no one in the US has a real choice in ISP. Even here in Silicon Valley, I find myself prevented at every turn from giving my money to local, independent ISPs. There's a little comfort in the fact that Comcast allocates and routes up to a /60, and performs very, very little inbound filtering.

Re:The network is hostile by gonzo on Monday August 17, 2015 @03:10AM (#10071658)
> Being riddled with fatal flaws is an aspect PGP shares with the lucrative Certificate Authority system, with S/MIME, with the DNS security system, with IPsec, with cell phone encryption.

which fatal flaws are present in "IPsec"?

Re:The network is hostile by mtgx on Monday August 17, 2015 @03:26AM (#10071694)
Re:The network is hostile by drdaeman on Sunday August 16, 2015 @09:25PM (#10070988)
No. The tech genie is only half out and it must continue to get out. Preferably before the legal solution comes out. We have crypto, but it's not even remotely ubiquitous. Consider yourself - how many of your peers would you be able to send OpenPGP-encrypted email message today?

The important thing to worry is that once some lawmaking passes and and journalists will happily announce the legal battle's won and the spies won't spy anymore (ha!) most will be happy about this, and continue to ignore any technical issues. That is, stay easy targets until the next scandal.

Both technical and legal solutions are important. We just can't ditch one and say that it's not important anymore - neither works well without the other.

Re:The network is hostile by mirimir on Sunday August 16, 2015 @07:56PM (#10070750)
Right. In Vinge's True Names, all network traffic is monitored by governments. So it's necessary to use cover traffic and steganography, in addition to encryption. That's where Tor seems headed, with ever better pluggable transports for bridges, and maybe even ephemeral website-like bridges from AWS etc.

But eventually, it may be necessary to get serious about steganography. With pervasive streaming HD video, covert channels providing even 0.1% of throughput would be workable. The harder challenge would be plausible deniability. If the steganography fails and that SWAT team arrives, you want them to discover that you've been compromised by covert-channel botnets. Just like every other user and server on the Internet.

Re:The network is hostile by x5n1 on Sunday August 16, 2015 @08:50PM (#10070897)
Yes this works in fiction novels, in real life it usually doesn't work. I could list the reasons why, but show me a case where it actually worked and we can talk further. One big hurdle is that there are too many flaws in complex systems, and you have to mess up just once and that includes flaws in your technology for them to get whatever they are after. Perfection does not exist in reality. Using any sort of excessive technology makes you stand out as a target that's in need to introspection. All complexity has costs associated with it, to set up all of this is time consuming and expensive. etc. etc.
Re:The network is hostile by mirimir on Sunday August 16, 2015 @10:03PM (#10071051)
Many people use VPN services for privacy, to get around geo-blocking, hide torrenting and so on. Where I live, at least 25% of Internet users do so. Tor use is less common. And so I access Tor through VPN services. And don't obviously stand out more than 25% of my neighbors.

But yes, it's complicated. I've been writing how-to guides for years, and people's eyes do tend to glaze. Still, I'm sure that it could be automated.

Smartphones are the huge problem. They're intentionally designed for tracking and surveillance. And they are the primary channel for Internet access in many places. So it does seem pretty hopeless :(

Re:The network is hostile by wyager on Sunday August 16, 2015 @09:21PM (#10070979)
>show me a case where it actually worked and we can talk further.

You mean like how people can anonymously buy drugs on the internet? It's working fine. It's not perfect, but it doesn't have to be.

Re:The network is hostile by mirimir on Sunday August 16, 2015 @10:09PM (#10071060)
There's no "anonymously" there. Maybe buyers use Bitcoins, and maybe they've mixed them well enough to hide the money trail. But for the most part, they provide meatspace mail addresses. To sellers who truly are anonymous. Who may be LEA. Who may ship illegal drugs at homeopathic dilution, and SWAT right after delivery.
Re:The network is hostile by wyager on Monday August 17, 2015 @06:03PM (#10076437)
And yet, despite all these worst-case scenarios you've outlined, it works great most of the time (from what I hear).
Re:The network is hostile by mirimir on Monday August 17, 2015 @07:33PM (#10076777)
It didn't work out so well for Curtis Green.[0]

> Starting in April 2012, a DEA undercover agent in Maryland (the UC), began communicating with Ulbricht about selling illegal drugs on Silk Road. That agent was one of several assigned to the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. The UC claimed to be a smuggler who specialized in moving substantial quantities of illegal drugs. In December 2012, Ulbricht set out to find a drug dealer on Silk Road who could purchase large quantities of drugs from the UC and directed his administrators, including Green, to assist. Green assisted the UC to establish contact with a buyer, who was an established seller of drugs on Silk Road (the Vendor). The UC and the Vendor negotiated a deal for one kilogram of cocaine for approximately $27,000 in Bitcoin, a digital currency that has no association with a national government, is difficult to track, and easy to move online.

> Without the knowledge of either Ulbricht or the UC, Green agreed to act as a middle-man for the Vendor and take delivery of drugs. As a result, the Vendor provided Green’s address to the UC as the place to which the cocaine was to be delivered. On January 17, 2013, an undercover U.S. Postal Inspector delivered the cocaine [very highly cut] to Green at his residence. Shortly after Green accepted delivery of the cocaine, federal agents with the HSI, DEA, U.S. Postal Inspectors and the U.S. Secret Service executed a search warrant at Green’s residence and recovered the kilogram of cocaine. U.S. Secret Service agents also conducted a forensic examination of Green’s computers and digital media seized during the search.

[0] http://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/administrator-silk-road-we...

Re:The network is hostile by wyager on Friday August 21, 2015 @06:15PM (#10100579)
Yes, there are specific instances where it does not work. What is your point? The same goes for buying drugs on the street. It seems to work quite well most of the time.
Re:The network is hostile by wavefunction on Sunday August 16, 2015 @11:20PM (#10071226)
Governments are concerned with entrepreneurs engaged through the net. Because governments are made up of former dealer/slangers who went "legit" liek bushes and others of that ilk
Re:The network is hostile by hackeraccount on Monday August 17, 2015 @01:52PM (#10074818)
It doesn't have to work in the sense of stopping an invasion of privacy. Name your governmental - or even non-governmental - organization will always be able to read any individual. The question is one of effort. In an optimal world Government would have some set of checks on who it monitors - there would be judges, warrants and probable cause. As things stand that's seeming less and less the case. In a slightly less better world the effort to monitor would be great enough that governments would be forced to pick and choose just who they're monitoring. Ideally that'd be picking bad people.
Re:The network is hostile by andrewflnr on Tuesday August 18, 2015 @01:50PM (#10080846)
If you can prove that it worked, it didn't actually work. Unless someone boasts about it later, all anyone will ever see of a successful play for plausible deniability is the denial. As far as you can tell, their machine really was a victim of a botnet.
Re:The network is hostile by jsprogrammer on Sunday August 16, 2015 @07:56PM (#10070751)
PGP/GPG are tools we have because the technical solution trumped attempts at force and law. Governments can do nothing to stop it. They have no control over mathematical realities. Force and law have no bearing on mathematics. A technical solution will always trump a violent or political solution.
Re:The network is hostile by mirimir on Sunday August 16, 2015 @08:11PM (#10070781)
Government force and law have no bearing on plant biochemistry, either. But they can punish those in possession of illegal plants. They can even punish those with illegal substances in their bodies. Just sayin' ;)
Re:The network is hostile by drdaeman on Sunday August 16, 2015 @09:34PM (#10071004)
They'll have to outlaw crypto first. And it's hard to put this genie back to the bottle, given that it's somewhat out already.

To outlaw but not make virtually anyone guilty (because some stuff like TLS is extremely common) is a hard task alone, and any attempts at this would be surely fiercely countered.

Re:The network is hostile by mtgx on Monday August 17, 2015 @03:24AM (#10071689)
Some politicians and government officials are already saying companies like Apple and Google are aiding terrorists. They don't necessarily have to outlaw it. They can just put such pressure on the providers of the biggest services, in order for them to use weaker encryption.
Re:The network is hostile by enraged_camel on Monday August 17, 2015 @06:53AM (#10072275)
Governments can use force to make you reveal your private keys. It doesn't have to be legal. NSA's mass surveillance isn't legal but they are still doing it, which proves that the government is above the law.
Re:The network is hostile by jsprogrammer on Monday August 17, 2015 @01:53PM (#10074827)
If it is 'impossible' for your key to be revealed...technical trumps force/law/politics once again.
Re:The network is hostile by enraged_camel on Monday August 17, 2015 @07:21PM (#10076738)
How would it be impossible for your key to be revealed?

Here's what I'm trying to say: there's absolutely nothing that prevents the government from forcing you to grant them access to your private (i.e. encrypted) content. If they decide that you're a threat to national security, they can do whatever they please to gain access to anything you have secured.

Before you say "but it's technologically impossible!" let me remind you that in any system, humans are the weakest link. How long do you think you can last under torture? The CIA has hundreds of "secret sites" overseas. What makes you think that the Department of Homeland Security doesn't have any equivalents here in the US, that they can imprison you in and torture you until you reveal everything you know?

It's really naive to think that technology can solve all problems. Think outside the box (or the computer, in this case) and really try to grasp what the most powerful nation in the history of the world is capable of. They can force the private jets of foreign officials to land in allied airports and search them thoroughly. If you think your fileserver is safe simply because you have its contents encrypted, you have a lot to learn.

Re:The network is hostile by jsprogrammer on Monday August 17, 2015 @08:32PM (#10076985)
Well, if you used a one time pad and burned the pad, it's essentially impossible to reveal the key. It does not matter how much some one chooses to torture you.
Re:The network is hostile by gozo on Sunday August 16, 2015 @08:16PM (#10070800)
While I agree that technical solutions aren't enough, the point isn't only to achieve security. It is to raise the stakes to the point that the government has to do things that general public doesn't support to keep their capabilities. Right now it's mostly a walkover in favor of the NSA.
Re:The network is hostile by rmc on Monday August 17, 2015 @05:20AM (#10071985)
> Do I encrypt my mail and risk a SWAT team blowing up my front door and shooting my dog

That's a best case. Worse case is they shoot you.