I wrote a long piece that says everything I'd say in a comment here:
Re:Edward Snowden at IETF 93
by throwaway7767 on Friday August 14, 2015 @12:36PM
(#10061106)
Thanks, that was a good read, and cleared up a lot of misunderstanding I had about DNSSEC!
You make a strong argument that DNSSEC cannot deliver any real advantages. I did not see anything to support your earlier statement that it's worse than nothing, but given the general uselessness of the protocol, I certainly won't be deploying it.
Re:Edward Snowden at IETF 93
by thoughtpolice on Friday August 14, 2015 @03:04PM
(#10062124)
One thing that makes it 'worse than nothing' is that it contributes to amplification attacks due to large response packets: http://dnscurve.org/amplification.html
Fair enough, my knowledge of DNSSEC is limited. I thought it provided confidentiality in addition to authentication, but I see I was mistaken.
I'm still not sure how you arrive at the conclusion that it is a net loss. Which attacks will DNSSEC enable that are not possible today? If you mean that it will give people a false sense of security, is that not the same as TLS today? Despite my hangups with the CA system I think we're better off with TLS than without it.
The NSA certainly has no problems with intercepting DNS requests today with their QUANTUM tools.
I am genuinely interested in hearing other ideas about how to provide confidentiality and authentication for DNS without central trust. Since you have clearly investigated these matters, I would like to ask again, are you aware of any promising projects or ideas in this regard? Because I would jump into the anti-DNSSEC camp in a heartbeat if one existed.